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CASENOTES
The Right to Counsel in Parental Rights Termination Proceedings:
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina' —
Parens patriae is the term traditionally used to describe the role of the state as
guardian of persons such as infants and incompetents who are legally unable to
act for themselves. 2 Under the parens patriae doctrine, the state is authorized to
intervene in the family relationship where necessary to protect the welfare of
the child. 3
 All states have statutory schemes which govern the exercise of this
power.* The most drastic form which state intervention in the parent-child
452 U.S. 18 (1981).
2 West Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (1971); BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1003 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
Singleman, A Case of Neglect: Parens Patriae Versus Due Process in Child Neglect Proceedings,
17 ARIZ. L. REV. 1055, 1057-59 (1979). For a comprehensive description of the historical devel-
opment of the parens patriae role of the state in the area of child neglect and abuse see Areen, Inter-
vention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63
GEO. L. REV. 887, 894-910 (1979).
See generally Areen, supra note 3, at 920-30; Coleman, Standards for Termination of Paren-
tal Rights, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 315, 326-35 (1980); Katz, Howe & McGrath, Child Neglect Laws in
America, 9 FAM. L.Q. I (1975); Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards
for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination
of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. L. REV. 623, 628-36 (1976).
In most states, permanent termination of parental rights is addressed in statutory provi-
sions separate from those dealing with temporary action to protect the child. See Katz, supra note
4, at 66-67; Wald, supra note 4, at 633-36. For examples of termination provisions, see, e.g. , ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. 55 8-531 to -544 (1974 & Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. 55 571-61 to -63
(1976 & Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE SS 16-2001 to -2015 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. SS 31-6-5-1 to
-6 (Burns 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. S$ 260.221-.245 (West, 1971 & Supp. 1981); MISS. CODE
ANN. 55 93-15-101 to -111 (Supp. 1981); MO. ANN. STAT. S$ 211.442-.492 (Vernon Supp.
1982); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT 55 611-634 (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.D. CENT. CODE S$
27-20-44 to -47 (1974 & Supp. 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, $5 1130-34 (West Supp. 1981);
S.C. CODE ANN. 55 20-11-10 to -60 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
While the specific statutory language varies, the grounds for termination generally in-
clude abandonment, abuse, and neglect. See Areen, supra note 3, at 920; Coleman, supra note 4,
at 326-32; Katz, supra note 4, at 67. See also Ketcham & Babcock, Statutory Standards for the Involun-
tary Termination of Parental Rights, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 530, 544-45 (1976).
In an increasing number of states, an additional basis for termination is parental failure
to make adequate progress in correcting conditions which led to an earlier adjudication of child
neglect. See, e.g.,  CAL. CIV. CODE 5 232.1(8) (West Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. S
19-11-105(b) (1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 40 $$ 1501 D(m), 1510 (Smith-Hurd 1980); IND.
CODE ANN. 31-6-5-4 (Burns 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 7A-289.32 (1981).
In a number of states, once one of the statutory grounds for termination is established,
the judge is required to make a further determination that termination is in the best interests of
the child before the petition is granted. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. $S 39.41(1)(f)1, 63.072 (West
Supp. 1982); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 199.603 (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. $
7A-289.31 (1981).
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relationship may take is the termination of parental rights. The effect of an
order terminating parental rights is to sever the parent-child relationship com-
pletely. The statutes are explicit in this regard. 5 After termination, the parent
has no further right to custody of the child,° and loses all right to control the up-
bringing of the child.' The parent is not entitled to be consulted or informed
about any decisions made with respect to the child's future, 8
 or to visit or com-
municate with the child.° In addition, the child may be adopted without the
parent's consent.'° The effect of the termination order, from the perspective of
the parent, is equivalent to the death of the child."
The termination of parental rights by the state results in a permanent
deprivation of a parent's fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a rela-
tionship with his or her child. 12 In several other cases where state action in-
fringes on fundamental liberty interests, the Supreme Court has held that due
process requires that counsel be provided for indigent litigants.' 3 The issue of
the right to counsel as a requisite of due process in parental rights termination
proceedings was not resolved, however, until the Court's decision in Lassiter v.
Department of Social Services in 1981. 1 *
The litigation in Lassiter arose in 1975, when the Department of Social
Services of Durham County, North Carolina received a complaint from a local
pediatric clinic that Abby Gail Lassiter, a mother of five children, had failed to
bring her youngest child, William, to the clinic for treatment of medical prob-
lems." Following the receipt of this complaint, a social worker visited the
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 7A-289.33 (1981) which provides:
An order terminating the parental rights completely and permanently terminates
all rights and obligations of the parent to the child and of the child to the parent,
arising from the parental relationship, except that the child's right of inheritance
from his or her parent shall not terminate until such time as a final order of adop-
tion is issued. Such parent is not thereafter entitled to notice of proceedings to
adopt the child and may not object thereto or otherwise participate therein.
See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S 8-539 (1974) (effect of termination into "divest the parent and
the child of all legal rights, privileges, duties and obligations with respect to each other. .
	 . ");
CAL. CIV. CODE S 232.6 (West Supp. 1981) ("A declaration of freedom from parental custody
and control pursuant to this chapter terminates all parental rights and responsibilities with regard
to the child.").
6 See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. 5 31-6-5-6(a) (Burns 1980) ("When the juvenile court ter-
minates the parent-child relationship, all rights, privileges, immunities, duties, .and obligations
Pertaining to that relationship (including any rights to custody, control, visitation or support) are
permanently terminated, and the parent's consent to the child's adoption is not required.").
7 Id.
Id.
9 Id.
1° Id.
" See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S 199.613(2) (Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1980) ("Where paren-
tal rights have been terminated . . . all legal relationships between the parent and child shall
cease to exist, the same ar if the relationship of parent and child had never existed, except that the child
shall retain the right to inherit from its parents under the laws of descent and distribution until
the child is adopted.") (emphasis added).
la See infra text and notes at notes 297-303.
" See infra text and notes at notes 202-65.
14 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
16 Brief of Petitioner, App. IV at 10-11, Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services of Durham
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Lassiter home.' 6 She found the child to be in need of medical attention and
took him to a local hospital." Doctors at the hospital diagnosed the child's
illness as the result of a severe infection which had not been properly treated."
The Department of Social Services initiated a proceeding to have William
declared a neglected child and asked that custody be transferred to the state. 19
Abby Lassiter was served with notice of this proceeding but did not attend. 2° At
the hearing, in June of 1975, the judge found that William had been neglected
and ordered that he be placed in the custody of the Department of Social Serv-
ices . 21
One year later, in June of 1976, Abby Lassiter was convicted of second-
degree murder and began serving a twenty-five to forty-year sentence of im-
prisonment. 22 Abby's mother, Mrs. Lucille Lassiter, assumed the responsibili-
ty of caring for four of her five grandchildren." William remained in the
custody of the state Department of Social Services."
In 1978, after Ms. Lassiter had been in prison for two years, the Depart-
ment of Social Services petitioned the court to terminate Abby Lassiter's
parental rights. 25 The Department alleged that termination was justified under
North Carolina law on two grounds. 26 First, the Department contended, Abby
Lassiter had failed to maintain contact with the child since December of 1975. 27
Second, the Department alleged, she had willfully left William in foster care for
more than two years without demonstrating substantial progress in correcting
the conditions that led to his removal. 28 In addition, the Department alleged
that Ms. Lassiter had failed to show a positive response to the diligent efforts of
the Department to strengthen her relationship with William or to make and
follow through with constructive planning for his future." Ms. Lassiter re-
County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (Transcript of the Evidence, In the Matter of William L.
Lassiter (N.C. D.C. Aug. 31, 1978 at 10-11)) [hereinafter cited as Transcript of Evidence].
16 Id. at 11.
17 Id.
'a Id.
19 452 U.S. at 52.
20 Id.
'I Id. at 20.
22 Id .
23 Id. at 52.
24 Id. at 20-21.
23
 Id.
26 Id. at 21.
37 Id. At the time of the termination hearing, the state statute provided for termination
upon a finding that the parent has without cause failed to establish or maintain concern or
responsibility as to the child's welfare. N.C. GEN. STAT. S 7A-289.32(1) (1977). The termination
statute was later amended and this provision was deleted. 1979 N:C. Sess. Laws c. 669, s. 2.
" 452 U.S. at 21.
29 Id. The language of the termination petition closely follows the statutory language.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32(2) (1981), which authorizes termination on a finding that:
The parent has willfully left the child in foster care for more than two consecutive
years without showing to the satisfaction of the court that substantial progress has
been made within two years in correcting those conditions which led to the
removal of the child for neglect, or without showing a positive response within two
years to the diligent efforts of a county department of social services, a child-caring
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ceived notice of the termination petition in prison. 3° She discussed the pending
proceeding with prison guards but they made no effort to assist her in securing
legal assistance." At the time that Ms. Lassiter received notice of the pending
termination proceeding, she was consulting with an attorney concerning a
possible appeal of her criminal conviction." She did not, however, mention the
termination proceeding to this attorney. 33
At the beginning of the termination hearing, the trial judge, on his own
motion, considered whether he should grant a continuance of the hearing to
enable Ms. Lassiter to secure counsel." He decided that since Ms. Lassiter
had access to an attorney in prison and had failed to consult him about the ter-
mination action, she had been afforded sufficient time and opportunity to ob-
tain counsel." The judge determined, therefore, that Ms. Lassiter was not en-
titled to any additional opportunity to seek representation." The hearing then
proceeded in the absence of counsel for Ms. Lassiter."
The principal state witness at the trial was a social worker who testified to
the circumstances surrounding the initial removal of William from Ms.
Lassiter's custody." This social worker was not personally involved in the
events leading to the initial finding of neglect." Her testimony as to the events
surrounding William's removal from his home was based on social service
department records. 40 Ms. Lassiter did not attempt to challenge this hearsay
testimony." The social worker also testified that since the initial removal of
William from his mother's custody, Ms. Lassiter had failed to maintain contact
with the child." Her testimony indicated that, in the more than two years that
had passed since the initial neglect proceeding, Ms. Lassiter had met with
William on only two occasions. 43 One meeting had been arranged by the
Department of Social Services and the other was a chance encounter in the
street." The social worker testified that Ms. Lassiter had not contacted the
institution or licensed child-placing agency to encourage the parent to strengthen
the parental relationship to the child or to make and follow through with construc-
tive planning for the future of the child.
In addition, N.C. GEN. STAT. s 7A-289.31 (1981) provides that once one of the statutory
grounds for termination is established, the judge must determine if termination is in the best in-
terests of the child.
'° 452 U.S. at 21.
31 Id. at 53.
32 Id. at 53 n.21.
33 Id. This attorney later indicated that he would not have been willing to represent Ms.
Lassiter in the termination action because she would be unable to compensate him for his serv-
ices. Id.
34 Id. at 21. Ms. Lassiter did not make a request at the beginning of the hearing for
counsel or indicate that she was unable to afford counsel. Id. at 22.
35 Id.
36 Id.
57 Id.
33 Id.
59 Id. at 53.
4° Id.
4' Id.
42
 Id. at 22.
43 Id.
44 Id. The initial removal of the child occurred in May of 1975. The arranged meeting
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Department to inquire about the child or to request any further meetings with
him after these two occasions. 45 Shortly after the second meeting, Ms. Lassiter
was imprisoned." She remained in prison until the termination hearing two
years later.° The social worker also testified that the Department had conclud-
ed, based on conversations with persons in the community familiar with the
Lassiter family, that placing William in his grandmother's care was not a
viable alternative to termination of Ms. Lassiter's parental rights." The
Department, according to the social worker, did not feel that Ms. Lassiter's
mother would be able adequately to discharge the responsibility of caring for
William. 49 There was no testimony, however, that the grandmother's care of
Ms. Lassiter's other four children was inadequate."
Ms. Lassiter attempted to cross-examine the social worker but was unable
to do so effectively." She did not understand the difference between question-
ing the witness and testifying herself.'" Ms. Lassiter's cross-examination con-
sisted largely of statements contesting the accuracy of the social worker's con-
clusion that termination was justified and arguments that William should be
placed in the custody of his grandmother. 53 Ms. Lassiter did not attempt to
show that much of the social worker's testimony was hearsay." Nor did Ms.
Lassiter try to show that her failure to visit William after the two initial
meetings was attributable to her imprisonment during much of the period in
question." Such a showing might have formed the basis for a defense to the
charge that she willfully failed to demonstrate concern and responsibility for
the child, grounds for termination under North Carolina law." Ms. Lassiter
also did not try to show that the Department had failed to make diligent efforts
to strengthen her relationship with William." Failure to respond to these
diligent efforts was one of the grounds on which the state sought to terminate
her parental rights."
Ms. Lassiter and her mother both testified against the termination. 59 Ms.
Lassiter testified that she had not neglected William. 6 ° During cross-examina-
tion by the state's attorney, Ms. Lassiter reiterated her argument that custody
took place in December, 1975; the chance encounter occurred in July, 1976. See Transcript of Evi-
dence, supra note 15, at 11-12.
" 452 U.S. at 22.
46 See Transcript of Evidence, supra note 15, at 12, 27, Ms. Lassiter was tried and convicted
of second-degree murder in July, 1976. Id. at 27.
• " 452 U.S. at 21.
01 Id. at 22.
49 Id.
" See Transcript of Evidence, supra note 15. In fact, the social worker testified that the
grandmother was doing a "fine job of caring for the other children." Id. at 13.
" 452 U.S. at 53.
52 Id.
" See Transcript of Evidence, supra note 15, at 19-24.
54 452 U.S. at 53.
55 Id. at 56.
56 Id. See supra text of statute at note 29.
" 452 U.S. at 56.
56 Id. at 2 1 .
59 Id. at 23.
60 Id.
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of the child should be given to his grandmother. 6 ' Ms. Lassiter's mother also
testified that she should be given custody of William. 62 She denied telling the
Social Services Department that she was not able to take on the responsibility
of caring for William. 63
 She also denied allegations that she had made no at-
tempt to maintain contact with her grandson during the time that he was in the
custody of the state. 64
 Ms. Lassiter was not informed that she could question
her mother and did not attempt to do so. 65
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Ms. Lassiter's
parental rights should be terminated. 66
 The judge found that Ms. Lassiter had
failed to contact the Social Services Department about the child since
December of 1975 and had failed to express concern about his welfare or plan
for his future since that time. 6 ' These failures, the judge concluded, constituted
a willfull failure to maintain concern or responsibility for the child, grounds for
termination under North Carolina law." The Court also found, as required by
state law, that termination was in the best interests of the child.°
Ms. Lassiter appealed from the termination order on the sole ground that
the trial court denied her due process of law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment when it failed to appoint counsel for her as an indigent parent in a
termination proceeding." After the North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected
her due process claim" and the Supreme Court of North Carolina summarily
denied her application for discretionary review, 72
 the Supreme Court of the
United States granted her petition for certiorari."
In a 5-4 decision, a majority of the Supreme Court held that due process
does not require that counsel be provided to all indigent parents facing state at-
tempts to terminate their parental rights." The majority observed that prior
cases involving right to counsel claims established a presumption against the
right in any case where the physical liberty of the litigant was not threatened by
the state's action." The Court then applied the balancing test which it has
developed for the determination of what process is due in any particular con-
text." Applying this test, the Court determined that the parent's interest in re-
taining parental rights and the risk of error in the absence of counsel was not of
61
 Id.
62 See Transcript of Evidence, supra note 15, at 52.
63
 452 U.S. at 23.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 55.
" Id. at 24.
67 Id. at 23-24.
66 Id. at 23-24. This ground for termination was repealed in 1979. See supra note 27.
69
 452 U.S. at 24. See supra note 29.
" 452'U.S. at 24.
21 ' In re William L. Lassiter, 43 N.C. App. 525, 259 S.E.2d 336 (1979).
73 In re William L. Lassiter, 299 N.C. 121, 262 S.E.2d 6 (1980).
73 Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 449 U.S. 819 (1980).
74
 452 U.S. at 31.
25 Id. at 26-27.
76 Id. at 27. See infra text and notes at notes 89-91.
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sufficient magnitude in all cases to overcome the presumption against ap-
pointed counsel." The Court concluded that in some cases, however, the
presumption would be overcome. -8 The Court therefore found that the right to
counsel in termination proceedings was to be determined on a case-by-case
basis." Examining the facts of Ms. Lassiter's case, the Court then determined
that the failure to appoint counsel for her did not constitute a violation of due
process."
The dissenting Justices rejected the majority's conclusion that precedent
supported a presumption against a right to appointed counsel in any case
where physical liberty was not at stake. 8 ' The dissenters asserted that the
balancing of the parent's interest, the state's interest and the risk of error in ter-
mination proceedings should lead to the conclusion that due process requires
that all indigent parents in such proceedings have a right to appointed
counsel. 82
The Lassiter decision is significant in two respects. First, the majority opin-
ion in Lassiter inaugurates a new, and more restrictive, approach to right to
counsel issues than has prevailed in the Court's past decisions. The Lassiter
analysis thus will have a significant impact on the future development of the
right to counsel in state courts. Second, the Lassiter Court's treatment of the
right to counsel issue in parental rights termination proceedings raises ques-
tions about the constitutional status of parental rights. Prior decisions
established that rights relating to family and children are fundamental and thus
entitled to the highest degree of constitutional protection. The Lassiter case
raises serious questions about the continued force of these earlier decisions.
This casenote will begin with a description of the reasoning of the majority
and dissenting opinions in Lassiter. A brief review of the development of the
right to counsel in state courts will then be presented. The reasoning of the
Lassiter Court will be analyzed against the background of this history. First, the
casenote will examine the Lassiter Court's conclusion that a presumption
against a right to counsel in cases not involving physical liberty may be derived
from prior cases. It will be demonstrated that the use of a presumption is incon-
sistent with the flexible approach to due process issues which the Court has
employed in past cases and is incompatible with the Court's past characteriza-
tion of family rights as fundamental. Second, the Court's decision to adopt a
case-by-case approach to the right to counsel in termination proceedings will be
analyzed. It will be maintained that the reasoning of the Lassiter Court cannot
" Id. at 31.
'" Id.
79 Id. at 31-32.
99 Id. at 32-33.
81 Id. at 40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion does not ex-
plicitly address the correctness of the majority's presumption. However, since Justice Stevens in-
dicated that he agreed with the reasoning of the Blackmun dissent, it is reasonable to assume that
Justice Stevens also rejected the presumption. See id. at 59-60.
82 Id. at 47 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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be reconciled with traditional due process methodology or prior decisions
establishing a fundamental right to family integrity. Finally, the implications of
the Lassiter decision for the future development of the right to counsel will be
explored. It will be suggested that if the Lassiter holding must stand, it should
be confined to right to counsel cases and should not be extended to cases in-
volving claims for other types of procedural protection.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S REASONING IN LASSITER.
A. The Majority's Approach
As the first step in its analysis of the claim that due process requires ap-
pointed counsel in termination proceedings, the Lassiter Court reviewed prior
cases which had addressed the issue of when fundamental fairness requires that
an indigent litigant be furnished with appointed counse1. 83 The majority found
that these precedents established the "pre-eminent generalization" 84 that the
right has been recognized only when physical liberty is threatened by state ac-
tion." From these cases, the Court drew the presumption that an indigent need
be provided with appointed counsel only when he is threatened with depriva-
tion of his physical liberty. 86
Since physical liberty is not the interest at stake in a parental rights ter-
mination proceeding, the Court found that the presumption against a right to
counsel applies to such proceedings. 87 The Court then applied the traditional
test for determining what process is due in a given situation." This test in-
volves a balancing of three elements." The first factor to be weighed is the
private interest affected by the state's action." The second factor is the govern-
mental interest implicated in the proceeding, including the financial and ad-
ministrative burdens on the state in providing additional safeguards." The
third factor is the risk of erroneous deprivations of the private interest under ex-
isting procedures and the value of additional procedures in reducing that risk."
The Court found that in the context of a parental rights termination pro-
ceeding, the private interest of the parent affected by the state's action is a
"commanding one." 83 According to the Court, prior decisions had established
that the parent's right to custody and control over the upbringing of the child is
65 Id. at 25-26.
84 Id. at 25.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 26-27.
" See id.
88
 Id. at 27.
88 Id. The Court referred to the case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35
(1975), which set out the three-part test for determining what process is due. Id.
88 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27.
81 Id.; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
82
 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
83 452 U.S. at 27. The Court noted that some parents may also face the possibility of
criminal charges arising out of the alleged mistreatment of the child. Id. at 27 n.3. In such a case,
the parent would have an additional interest to protect. Id.
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such an important interest that only a powerful countervailing state interest
would justify interference with the parent-child relationship." The Court
recognized that the goal of the state in a termination action is not merely to in-
fringe on the parent's right to custody and control over the child but to
eradicate these rights." If the state succeeds in the termination proceeding the
Court concluded, it will have "worked a unique kind of deprivation." 96
The Court then considered the second factor in the balancing test, the
state's interests in a parental rights termination proceeding. 97 The majority
noted that the state has a vital interest in the welfare of the child and, therefore,
a strong interest in ensuring that the termination proceeding results in a fair
and accurate decision." The Court observed that since the provision of counsel
for the parent may increase the likelihood that termination decisions will be
made correctly, the state's interest may also be promoted by making counsel
available to indigent parents. 99 The Court also recognized, however, that the
state has a countervailing interest in avoiding the costs associated with an
obligation to appoint counsel for such parents.'" The majority conceded that
the state's interest in keeping the cost of termination proceedings to a
minimum is legitimate but asserted that this interest is not significant enough
to overcome individual interests as important as those implicated in a parental
rights termination proceeding.'°' The Court also noted that the costs which
would be incurred by the state if required to provide counsel to indigent
parents in such proceedings would be far less than those imposed on the states
by the decisions establishing a right to appointed counsel in state criminal pro-
ceedings.'° 2
Continuing its application of the traditional test for determining what
process is due, the Court found that the risk of error in parental rights termina-
tion proceedings conducted without counsel is potentially substantial.'" The
Court noted that expert medical and psychiatric testimony may be presented in
some termination proceedings and that few parents are equipped to understand
or respond to such testimony.'" The Court also recognized that parents who
become the subject of termination proceedings tend to have little education and
to be less able than most to deal with the problems of life.' 05 Consequently, the
Court concluded, when faced with the prospect of defending against a state at-
tempt to terminate their parental rights, they may become so upset and con-
94 Id. at 27.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 27-28.
98 Id. at 27.
99 Id. at 27-28.
'°° Id. at 28.
1 ° 1 Id.
'°' Id.
'°' Id. at 30.
104 Id.
t°' Id.
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fused that they are unable to present their case against termination
effectively. X 06
 Thus, the Court concluded, the complexity of the issues and the
incapacity of the parent may create a significant risk of an erroneous decision to
terminate parental rights.'"
The Court then balanced the personal interest at stake in termination pro-
ceedings, the state's interest involved, and the risk of error in the absence of
counsel, against the presumption that there is no right to counsel unless a
deprivation of physical liberty is at stake.'" The combination of the important
interest of the parent in maintaining the relationship with the child, the state's
shared interest in a correct decision and its relatively insignificant pecuniary in-
terest, and the potentially high risk of an erroneous decision in the absence of
counsel for the parent, according to the Court, would overcome the presump-
tion against appointed counsel in some cases.'" The Court declared, however,
that the presumption would not be overcome in all cases because the relative
weight of these factors may vary." 0 Thus, the Court concluded, due process
does not require that counsel be provided to indigent parents in all termination
proceedings."' The Court instead held that the right to counsel will be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis and will depend on the result of the balancing
test as applied to the facts of each case." According to the Court, the trial
judge will have the responsibility of making the initial determination as to
whether due process requires appointed counsel in any particular case."'
The Court dismissed as imprudent any attempt to provide guidelines for
lower courts to follow in determining whether counsel should be appointed
because of the wide variety of factual situations which may arise in the context
of parental rights termination proceedings."* The Court examined the facts of
'°6 Id. The Court noted that a number of state courts have determined that the risk of a
parent being unable adequately to present his or her case against termination without the aid of
an attorney is substantial, Id. The Court also recognized that two statistical studies had been con-
ducted which attempted to measure how the lack of counsel affects the accuracy of termination
decisions. Id. at 29 n.5. The Court indicated that it did not find these statistics "illuminating."
Id. Both studies showed that hearings in which the parent was represented by counsel resulted in
a lower percentage of findings against the parent than hearings in which the parent was
unrepresented. See Note, Representation in Child-Neglect Cases,. Are Parents Neglected?, 4 COLUM. J . L.
& Soc. PROBS. 230, 241 (1968); Brief of Respondent at 38-39, 25a-31a, Lassiter v. Department
of Social Services of Durham County, N.C., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (study of state initiated termina-
tion actions in 73 North Carolina counties). The dissenters in Lassiter would give greater weight
to this evidence. See infra note 143.
1 ° 7 452 U.S. at 30.
108 Id. at 31.
109 Id. The Court stated that the presumption would be overcome if, in a given case, the
parent's interest were at its strongest, the state's interest at its weakest, and the risk of error at its
peak. Id.
110 Id.
'" Id.
"2
 Id. at 31-32.
" 3 Id. The Court declared that the trial judge's decision would be subject to appellate
review. Id. at 32.
" 4 Id.
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the Lassiter case, however, and concluded that the failure to appoint counsel for
Ms. Lassiter did not constitute a violation of due process." 5
The Court noted that the grounds on which the state sought to terminate
Ms. Lassiter's parental rights would not provide the basis for criminal charges
against her." 6 Ms. Lassiter, therefore, could not have claimed that she re-
quired counsel to protect herself against possible criminal charges."' The
Court also pointed out that the state did not offer any expert witnesses in sup-
port of its petition for termination and that no particularly complex issues of
either substantive or procedural law were involved in the case.'" On the basis
of these observations, the Court apparently concluded, without so stating, that
the risk of error in the proceeding was not significant even though Ms. Lassiter
was not afforded the assistance of counsel. The Court conceded that hearsay
evidence was admitted which an attorney for Ms. Lassiter might have at-
tempted to exclude." 5 The Court also recognized that an attorney might have
developed certain defenses to the termination petition. 12° For example, the
Court noted that Ms. Lassiter did not develop the argument that the Social
Services Department had failed to make diligent efforts to strengthen her rela-
tionship with her child and that, therefore, termination was not justified.' 2 '
The Court also acknowledged the possibility that counsel might have presented
more effectively Ms. Lassiter's suggested alternative to termination — that
custody of the child should be placed with his grandmother. 122 The Court con-
cluded, however, that the evidence of the disinterest that both Ms. Lassiter and
her mother had displayed toward the child since the state had assumed custody
of him was sufficiently strong that further development of these defenses would
not have affected the outcome of the proceeding.'"
In so concluding, the Court also observed that Ms. Lassiter failed to attend
the initial neglect proceeding and failed to mention the pending termination
proceeding to the attorney she was consulting regarding her criminal appeal.' 24
These failures, according to the Court, demonstrated that Ms. Lassiter was not
very interested in contesting the termination. 125 A parent's demonstrated lack
of interest in attending a hearing, the majority stated, should be considered in
determining whether counsel should be appointed.'" Since the termination
proceeding did not expose Ms. Lassiter to potential criminal liability, involve
"5 Id. at 33.
16 Id. at 32.
'" Id.
112
119 Id.
12° Id. at 32-33.
121 Id. at 32.
122 Id. at 33.
"3 Id. at 32-33.
124 Id. at 33.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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expert testimony, complex issues, or provoke a very interested response from
Ms. Lagsiter, the Court concluded that the failure of the trial court to appoint
counsel for Ms. Lassiter did not render the proceeding fundamentally
unfair.'"
The Lassiter majority recognized that the North Carolina court's decision
that due process did not require appointed counsel for Ms. Lassiter conflicted
with recent holdings of other courts that have considered the right to counsel
issue in termination proceedings.'" The Court also noted that many states
have established, by statute, a right to counsel in termination proceedings 129
and that numerous model acts relating to juvenile court proceedings also have
included provisions for the appointment of counsel for parents in such pro-
ceedings.' 3° The Court emphasized that its decision that counsel was not con-
stitutionally required in all cases should not be read to question the wisdom or
desirability of the higher standards adopted by these decisions, statutes, and
model acts.'" The Court stated that wise public policy may lead to the
establishment of higher standards than those required by the Constitution.'"
Thus, while recognizing that the weight of judicial and scholarly opinion
would find that due process requires the appointment of counsel for all indigent
parents faced with state attempts to terminate their parental rights, the Lassiter
majority held that no such absolute right was constitutionally mandated. The
Court found that the result of the balancing of the parent's interest, the state's
interest, and the risk of error in the absence of counsel was not sufficiently
weighted in favor of the parent in all termination cases to overcome the
presumption against the right to counsel. The Court instead decided that the
existence of such a right should be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Chief Justice Burger, in a brief concurring opinion, asserted that he found
Ms. Lassiter's claim that she was denied due process totally without merit.'"
127 Id.
12° Id. at 30-31. The Court noted that there was no presently authoritative case, except
for the North Carolina judgment now before us, holding that an indigent parent has no due proc-
ess right to appointed counsel in termination proceedings." Id. For state cases that have held that
a parent in a termination or neglect proceeding has a right to appointed counsel, see, e.g.,
Department of Public Welfare v. J.K.B., 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2202, 393 N.E.2d 406, 407
(1979); Danforth v. State Dept. of Health and Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 795 (Me. 1973); Crist v.
N.J. Div. of Youth and Family Services, 128 N.J. Super. 402, 416, 320 A.2d 203, 211 (1974);
State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St. 2d 6, 13, 399 N.E.2d 66, 70 (1980); In re Chad S., 580
P.2d 983, 985 (Okla. 1978); In re Myricks, 85 Wash. 252, 253, 533 P.2d 841 (1975).
129 452 U.S. at 34. See, e.g. , ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 8-225 (Supp. 1981); CAL. CIV.
CODE 5 237.5 (West Supp. 1981); COLO. REV. STAT. 5 19-1-106(1)(b)(ii) (1978); D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. 5 16-2304(b) (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. 5 15-11-30(b) (1982); IDAHO CODE
SS 16-1606(c), 1608(b) (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch . 37 5 701-20(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981);
IOWA CODE ANN. 5 232.113 (West Supp. 1981); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 199.603(8) (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1980).
13° 452 U.S. at 34. See, e.g., JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS
RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR PRIVATE PARTIES, STANDARD 2.3(b) (I.J.A.-A.B.A. 1970);
MODEL ACTS FOR FAMILY COURTS AND STATE-LOCAL CHILDREN'S PROGRAMS, 5 25 (Office
of Youth Development, H.E.W. 1975).
131 452 U.S. at 34.
1 S 2 Id. at 33.
191 Id. at 34 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
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The Chief Justice apparently found the evidence supporting the state's claim
that termination was required to safeguard the child's welfare to be so compel-
ling that the presence or absence of counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not possibly
have influenced the decision. He emphasized the fact that Ms. Lassiter had
been convicted of murder and faced a lengthy prison sentence as a result of this
conviction.'" He also noted that she had demonstrated little interest in her
child.'" The Chief Justice concluded that Ms. Lassiter's claim that the ter-
mination decision was made unfairly because she did not have the aid of
counsel was so devoid of merit that a denial of certiorari might have been
justified.'" Since the Court chose to hear the case, however, the Chief Justice
acquiesced in the holding of the majority that the right to counsel in termina-
tion proceedings should be determined on a case-by-case basis.'"
B. The Dissenting Opinions
There were two dissenting opinions in Lassiter. In an opinion joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice Blackmun rejected the majority's con-
clusion that due process does not require an absolute right to counsel in paren-
tal rights termination proceedings) The dissent agreed with the majority that
the appropriate test to determine what process is due involves a weighing of the
interests of the individual and the state and the risk of error in the proceeding
in the absence of the requested procedural protection. 139 Noting that prior deci-
sions have recognized a fundamental liberty interest in freedom of choice in
matters involving the family,'" the dissent agreed with the Court's conclusion
that the termination of parental rights by the state constitutes a unique kind of
deprivation and that the parent's interest in ensuring that unwarranted ter-
minations do not occur is a commanding one."' The dissent also agreed with
the majority's characterization of the state's pecuniary interest in avoiding an
obligation to appoint counsel as insignificant when compared to the parent's
interest. 142 Finally, the dissent found, as did the majority, that the risk of error
in a parental rights termination proceeding in which the parent is not
represented by counsel is potentially substantial.'" In fact, the dissent asserted
that the majority's conclusion that there exists a risk that an unrepresented
131 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
' 37 Id. at 34-35.
In Id. at 35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 37-38.
' 4° Id. at 38-39.
14 ' Id. at 35, 40.
142 Id. at 47.
143 Id. at 42-47. The dissent gave greater weight than did the majority to the statistical
studies indicating that fewer terminations resulted when the parent was represented at the hear-
ing. Id. at 46 n.15. The dissent asserted that since no evidence in the studies indicated that
parents who can afford counsel are less culpable than those who cannot, "it seems reasonable to
infer that a sizable number of cases against unrepresented parents end in termination solely
because of the absence of counsel." Id.
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parent will not be able to defend effectively against a termination action was a
"profound understatement. ),I44
The dissent discussed several characteristics of termination actions which
lead to high risk of error when a parent is not represented by counsel.'" To
begin,. the dissent emphasized that the termination proceeding is a formal
judicial proceeding in which the state and the parent occupy adversarial posi-
tions.'" Further, they noted that the state has access to resources, such as ex-
perienced counsel and expert witnesses, that enhance its ability to present its
case in favor of termination and that are not available to indigent parents."'
According to the dissent, this imbalance in resources creates a serious risk of er-
roneous decisions. 148
 In addition, the dissenters asserted that the generally im-
precise nature of the standards by which the need to terminate is measured
enhances the risk of error.'" They pointed out that, under the North Carolina
statute,'" the termination inquiry involves determinations about the "will-
fulness" of parental failures to demonstrate concern for the child, the
"diligence" of Social Service Department efforts to strengthen the parent-child
relationship after initial removal of the child from the home, and the
"positiveness" of parental responses to these efforts. 151
 The dissent argued that
the imprecise nature of the statutory standards increases the risk of error
because the unrepresented parent may be unable adequately to present
arguments countering the state's assertions that these standards were
satisfied. 15" The parent's failure to recognize these arguments, or to present
them effectively, the dissent concluded, may lead to a substantial risk of an er-
roneous decision.'"
Having determined that the parent's interest was fundamental, the state's
interest was far less significant, and the risk of error was substantial, the dissent
concluded that due process requires appointed counsel in all termination pro-
ceedings.'" The dissent rejected the majority's conclusion that prior cases
established a presumption against a right to appointed counsel in cases, such as
termination proceedings, which do not involve a potential deprivation of
physical liberty.'" Prior decisions relating to the right to counsel established,
144 Id.
 at 46.
145 Id. at 42-47.
146 Id. at 42-44.
' 47 Id. at 43.
145 Id. at 44.
145 Id. at 44-45.
'5° The language of the statute is set out at notes 27 and 29 supra.
15 ' 452 U.S. at 44-45.
"2 Id. at 45-46. Justice Blackmun concluded that a parent cannot prevail without being
able to "identify material issues, develop defenses, gather and present sufficient supporting non-
hearsay evidence and conduct cross-examination of adverse witnesses." Id.
'5 ' Id. at 46. The dissent also asserted that the imprecise nature of termination standards
increases the risk of error because such standards may lead judges to evaluate the evidence using
subjective standards of proper parental conduct, or to defer too readily to the opinions of the
state's social services experts. Id.
154
 Id. at 48.
155 Id. at 40.
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according to the dissent, that the presence or absence of an interest in physical
liberty is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the recognition of the
right.' 36 The dissent also asserted that the use of a presumption is inconsistent
with the Court's traditional approach to due process issues which is based on a
balancing of the interests of the parties and the risk of error in the particular
context under consideration.'" According to the dissent, since the Court .
recognized the parent's interest as fundamental, the state's interest as less im-
portant, and the risk of error as significant, the majority should have concluded
that due process requires the appointment of counsel in all termination
cases.' 58
The dissenting Justices also rejected the majority's decision to adopt a
case-by-case approach to the right to appointed counsel in parental rights ter-
mination proceedings.'" They asserted that the Court's adoption of a case-by-
case approach is inconsistent with traditional due process analysis.' 60 This
analysis, according to the dissent, involves consideration of the interests of the
individual and the state and the risk of error in the context under considera-
tion. 16 ' The dissenters maintained that, in the past, the Court has balanced
these factors to develop general rules applicable to all cases within a particular
context.'" The dissent asserted that the application of this analysis in the con-
text of parental rights termination proceedings requires a finding that all in-
digent parents involved in state-initiated termination proceedings have a right
to appointed counsel.' 63
The dissent also pointed out the practical problems that the administra-
tion of the majority's case-by-case approach will entail.'" For example, ap-
pellate review of the record of a termination proceeding in which a parent was
not represented by counsel will not provide adequate protection against unfair
and inaccurate decisions.'" The contributions that counsel for the parent
might have made to the fairness of the proceeding, according to the dissent,
cannot be determined with any certainty through the process of appellate
review.'" The dissent further asserted that the problem facing an appellate
court in trying to estimate the effect of the absence of counsel on the fairness of
the proceeding will be duplicated on the trial court level.'" The dissenters
maintained that it will be as difficult for the trial judge to determine before the
126 Id.
137 Id. at 41-42.
156 Id. at 48.
1S3 Id. at 49.
'6° Id.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 48-49. The Blackmun dissent emphasized that its conclusion that indigent
parents should have a right to counsel would apply only to cases where the state initiates the ter-
mination action. Id. at 48 & n.17. Thus, according to the dissent, parents litigating between
themselves the custody of a child would not have a right to counsel. Id.
164 Id. at 50.
163 Id. at 50-51.
166 Id. at 51.
1 " Id. at 51 n.19.
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fact whether counsel is necessary to ensure fairness as it will be for the appellate
court to make the same determination after the fact.' 66 The dissent also noted
that the case-by-case approach requires ad hat review of state court termination
decisions.' 69 Such review of state decisions, the dissent asserted, will involve a
significant degree of federal interference in state proceedings and transform the
Court into a "super family court. ""°
The Lassiter dissenters thus found that the case-by-case approach was not
only inadequate to ensure fairness, but also that the supposed advantages such
an approach was thought to have in minimizing federal interference with state
proceedings were largely illusory.'" They therefore rejected the majority's
case-by-case approach.' 72 The dissent would adopt instead an absolute rule
that counsel be provided to indigents facing state attempts to terminate their
parental rights. ' 73
Under the dissent's analysis, since due process requires the appointment
of counsel for indigent parents in all termination proceedings, the failure to
provide counsel to Ms. Lassiter constituted a violation of due process. More-
over, the dissent maintained that the facts of the Lassiter case provide a clear ex-
ample of the need for counsel in such proceedings. 174 They emphasized that
most of the evidence which the state offered to support termination was hearsay
testimony to which Ms. Lassiter made no objection.' 75 The dissent also ob-
served that Ms. Lassiter did not develop three possible defenses to the termina-
tion action. 176 First, they noted that she might have defended against the
charge of "willful" failure to demonstrate concern for the child by pointing out
that her incarceration precluded contact with the child.' 77 A second defense
which the dissenters claimed Ms. Lassiter might have been able to raise was
that the suggestion of granting custody to the grandmother constituted a con-
structive plan for the child's future. 18 Such a defense would have countered
the state's claim that her failure to engage in such planning justified the ter-
mination of her parental rights.'" Third, according to the dissent, Ms. Lassiter
might have argued that the Department of Social Services had failed to execute
its statutory duty to make diligent efforts to strengthen her relationship with
her child. 164 The dissent asserted that these potential defenses were not clearly
presented at the termination hearing."' They indicated that an important fac-
168 Id.
168 Id. at 51.
' 7° Id, at 51-52.
171 Id.
"2 Id. at 48-49.
'" Id. at 48.
14 Id. at 52.
1 " Id. at 53.
176 Id. at 56.
177 Id.
1 " Id.
"8 Id.
188 Id.
181 Id. at 54-57.
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for in Ms. Lassiter's failure to present effectively these potential defenses was
her inability to conduct an adequate cross-examination of the state's witness. 182
According to the dissent, the transcript of the trial court proceeding
demonstrated that Ms. Lassiter did not understand that the purpose of cross-
examination was to develop testimony favorable to her through questioning of
the witness.'" The dissent noted that Ms. Lassiter's attempts at cross-
examination consisted largely of declarative statements.'" These statements,
in the dissent's view, might have been developed by an experienced attorney
into substantive arguments against termination.' 85 Ms. Lassiter's inability to
develop these arguments effectively in the absence of counsel, the dissent
pointed out, resulted in a proceeding which did not conform to the standard of
fundamental fairness established by the due process clause.'"
The dissent recognized that the provision of counsel to Ms. Lassiter and
the development of these defenses would not necessarily have changed the
result of the termination proceeding.'" According to the dissent, however, the
issue was not whether the presence of counsel might have led to a different deci-
sion but rather whether counsel was required to ensure that the parent has a
meaningful opportunity to be heard.' 88
 The dissent asserted that because Ms.
Lassiter was unable effectively to present her case against termination without
counsel, she was not given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.'" The dis-
sent found, therefore, that the failure to provide counsel for Ms. Lassiter
deprived her of due process.
In a separate dissenting opinion,'" Justice Stevens also reached the con-
clusion that due process requires that all parents facing state attempts to ter-
minate their parental rights be afforded the assistance of counsel.'" He agreed
with the conclusion of the other dissenting Justices that the proper application
of the balancing test for the determination of what process is due leads to a find-
ing that counsel should be provided in all termination proceedings.' 92 Justice
Stevens maintained, however, that the balancing test is appropriate only in
cases involving property rather than liberty interests.'" He asserted that the
182
189 Id
184 Id. at 56.
"5 Id. at 57.
"6 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id.
"9 Id. The dissenters found "virtually incredible" the Court's conclusion that Ms.
Lassiter's hearing was fundamentally fair. Id.
' 9° Id. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
191 Id. at 60.
192 Id. at 59.
193 Id. The Court, however, has not limited the application of the balancing test to prop-
erty cases. See, e.g. , Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 495 (1980) (transfer of prisoners to mental in-
stitutions); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 599 (1979) (commitment of minors to mental institu-
tions); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675 (1977) (corporal punishment of school children);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480-84 (1972) (parole revocation).
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cost-benefit analysis which the balancing test entails is appropriate in cases in-
volving property interests where the issue is the procedures required to ensure
fairness in the allocation of material resources. 194
 When the interest at stake is a
liberty interest, however, such as that involved in a criminal prosecution or in a
parental rights termination proceeding, Justice Stevens concluded, such a cost-
benefit analysis is not appropriate. 195
 This conclusion was based on his percep-
tion that the value of protecting such an interest against unwarranted state in-
terference is immeasurable. 196 Thus, according to Justice Stevens, regardless of
the strength of the state's interest in not appointing counsel, the parents' in-
terest in maintaining their relationship with their child is so significant that
counsel must be appointed in all termination proceedings.'"
As the preceding discussion points out, the Lassiter majority applied a
balancing test and then weighed the result of that test against a presumption
against a right to counsel in parental rights termination proceedings. Finding
that the presumption would not be overcome in all cases, the Court held that
due process does not require an absolute right to counsel for indigent parents in
termination proceedings. Conversely, the dissenting opinions, applying the
same balancing test but rejecting the majority's presumption, concluded that
due process requires appointed counsel in all such cases. The following sections
will examine the reasoning of the Lassiter majority and explore the analytical
and policy problems raised by the majority's approach.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY'S REASONING
The Lassiter majority held that due process does not provide indigent
parents an absolute right to counsel in termination proceedings. 198
 The Court
established a presumption against a right to counsel in termination proceedings
because they do not involve a threat to physical liberty. 199 According to the ma-
jority, the balancing of the parent's interest in avoiding termination, the state's
interest in not appointing counsel and the risk of error in the absence of counsel
does not weigh sufficiently in favor of the parent to overcome the presumption
in all cases. 20° Consequently, the Court determined that a case-by-case ap-
proach to the right to counsel in termination proceedings was sufficient to
satisfy due process. 20 ' The next section will analyze the reasoning of the Lassiter
Court. First, the historical development of the right to counsel in state courts
will be examined. The Lassiter Court's conclusion that prior cases establish a
presumption against a right to counsel in cases that do not involve the in-
dividual interest in physical liberty will be evaluated. It will be demonstrated
194 452 U.S. at 59.
19s
196 Id.
I" Id.
198 Id. at 31.
1" See supra text and notes at notes 83-87.
964I 452 U.S. at 31.
2" Id. at 31-32.
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that the Court's prior decisions regarding the right to counsel do not support
the Lassiter presumption. It will also be shown that the case-by-case approach
has been rejected by the Court in past right to counsel cases and that the
analytical and policy reasons which compelled this rejection render the ap-
proach inadequate for termination proceedings. It will further be demonstrated
that the Lassiter approach not only constitutes a departure from traditional due
process analysis but also raises questions about the continued vitality of prior
decisions which recognized the fundamental nature of rights relating to the
family.
A. A Review of Prior Right to Counsel Cases
The sixth amendment guarantees the right to counsel in all federal
criminal prosecutions.'" This guarantee has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court to require, in the absence of a knowing, intelligent waiver, that indigent
defendants be provided counsel, at government expense. 203 In a series of cases,
the Court has addressed the issue of the extent to which the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment establishes a corresponding right in state criminal
and non-criminal proceedings. 2 °4
Initially, the Court rejected the idea that the right to counsel was required
in all state criminal prosecutions. 205 Instead, the Court examined the pro-
ceedings in each case to determine if the absence of counsel rendered the trial
fundamentally unfair. 206 Powell v. Alabama was the first case in which the Court
reversed a state criminal conviction because the lack of assistance of counsel
had resulted in an unfair trial. 207 In Powell, the Court held that, in a capital
case, where the indigent defendant is unable adequately to present his case due
to ignorance, feeble-mindedness, or illiteracy, counsel must be appointed for
him. 2"
202 U.S. CONST., amend. VI. The amendment provides: In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
20" Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463-64 (1938).
204 See infra text and notes at notes 205-65.
2°' The question of whether the sixth amendment right to counsel extended to the states
was part of the larger controversy concerning which provisions of the Bill of Rights were imposed
on the states through the fourteenth amendment. For a comprehensive description of the Court's
struggle with this larger controversy see G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 476-501 (10th
ed. 1980); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBER-
TIES 103-17 (5th ed. 1981). The Court has rejected the broad "incorporationist" reading of the
fourteenth amendment, which would require that the states conform to all provisions of the Bill of
Rights. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 53 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 323 (1937). Instead, the Court has determined that the requirements of due process are to be
satisfied by an examination of the proceedings in each case to ascertain if they were conducted in
accordance with natural, inherent and fundamental principles of fairness. See Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. at 54 & n.13; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942); Palko v. Connect-
icut, 302 U.S. at 328.
206
	 supra cases cited at note 205.
202 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
20e
	
at 71. In Powell, the defendants were young, illiterate black men. Id. at 51-52.
They were convicted of capital charges and sentenced to death. Id. at 50. The Court noted the
1196	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
	
[Vol. 23:1177
The issue of whether the right to counsel recognized in Powell extended
beyond capital cases was considered by the Court in Betts v. Brady. 209 The
Court found that Betts' felony trial was not fundamentally unfair although the
defendant was not represented by counsel."° The Court recognized that, in
some cases, lack of counsel may result in a trial which does not satisfy the re-
quirements of due process but rejected the notion that the fourteenth amend-
ment "embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in
any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not
represented by counsel." 21 '
The Court applied the case-by-case approach exemplified by Betts for
twenty years. 212 Then, in Gideon v. Wainright,'" the Court rejected the Betts
holding that the fourteenth amendment did not require that all indigent de-
fendants in state felony prosecutions be afforded the assistance of counsel. 214
The Gideon Court extended the sixth amendment right to counsel to all state
felony prosecutions."' The Court reasoned that, in an adversary system of
criminal justice, no defendant could be assured a fair trial in the absence of
assistance of counse1. 2 " The Court recalled language in Powell v. Alabama
which explicitly described the defendant's need for counsel and emphasized the
danger of unfair convictions when the defendant is forced to face his accusers
alone: 2 ' 7
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
difficulty which even intelligent and educated laymen would have in presenting an adequate
defense without the assistance of counsel. Id. at 69. In a case where the defendants were ignorant
and illiterate, the Court found that requiring them to defend against capital charges without the
aid of counsel was a clear denial of due process. Id. at 71.
"5
 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
210 Id. at 472-73. The Court noted that the determinative issue in Betts' robbery trial —
the relative veracity of the state's witnesses who placed Betts at the scene of the robbery as op-
posed to that of Betts' witnesses who claimed he was elsewhere at the time — was a simple one.
Id, at 472. The Court also pointed out that the defendant was of ordinary intelligence and had
some prior experience with the criminal process. Id. These factors led the Court to conclude that
the lack of assistance of counsel did not so handicap the defendant in presenting his defense as to
render the trial fundamentally unfair. Id. at 472-73.
211 Id. at 473.
212 See, e.g infra cases cited at note 314.
213 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
214 Id. at 343-45.
213
 Id. at 342. Gideon was one of a series of decisions in which the Court selectively incor-
porated certain provisions of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment, thus making them
obligatory on the states. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (sixth amend-
ment right to trial by jury); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-18 (1967) (sixth amendment
right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213,
222-23 (1967) (sixth amendment right to a speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403
(1965) (sixth amendment right to confront opposing witnesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I, 6
(1964) (fifth amendment right to be free from self-incrimination); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
655 (1961) (fourth amendmerit right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures); In re
Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (sixth amendment right to a public trial).
216 372 U.S. at 344.
217
 Id. at 344-45.
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educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence ir-
relevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the
danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his in-
nocence.'"
The Court thus recognized that innocent defendants face a substantial risk of
unjust conviction if they are not represented by counsel. 219 The Gideon Court
also noted that in every felony case the state uses the services of expert pros-
ecutors and that defendants who have the resources to do so invariably employ
attorneys to assist them in their defense. 22° The Court concluded that fairness
could not be assured unless indigent defendants were aided by counse1. 22 '
In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 222
 the right to counsel in state felony prosecutions
recognized by Gideon was extended to state misdemeanor trials in which the
penalty imposed on conviction was incarceration. 223
 While the Court noted
that both Powell and Gideon involved felonies, it concluded that similar reason-
ing is applicable to any criminal proceeding where the defendant faces loss of
liberty. 224 The Court recognized that imprisonment, even for a short time, in-
volves a serious intrusion on constitutionally protected liberty interests. 225 The
Court also noted that the legal issues involved in a misdemeanor trial which
results in the incarceration of the defendant are not necessarily less complex
than those involved in a felony prosecution.'" In addition, the Court observed
that the pressure on judicial resources which is created by the large volume of
misdemeanor prosecutions encourages state courts to emphasize speed and effi-
ciency rather than fairness to litigants. 227 The Court concluded that the risk of
error in such an "assembly line" system of justice is substantia1. 228 In order to
prevent unjustified deprivations of liberty, the Court held that counsel must be
provided to defendants in misdemeanor prosecutions where conviction results
in incarceration. 229
2" 287 U.S. at 68-69.
219 372 U.S. at 344-45.
"° Id. at 344.
"' Id.
222 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
223 Id. at 37.
224 Id. at 32.
225 Id. at 37.
226 Id. at 33.
22 ' Id. at 34.
226 at 36. The Court noted that a statistical study had indicated that defendants with
counsel were five times more likely to have charges dismissed than unrepresented defendants. Id.
The Court cited the AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, LEGAL COUNSEL FOR MISDE-
MEANANTS, PRELIMINARY REPORT (1970). Id.
229 407 U.S. at 40. The Court noted that M many cases the defendant is unlikely to be
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In Scott v. Illinois,'" the most recent case involving the right to counsel in
state criminal proceedings, the Court held that the right does not extend to de-
fendants involved in misdemeanor prosecutions where the penalty on convic-
tion is a fine."' The Court noted that the holding in Argersinger, that the right to
counsel must be extended to a defendant who will be deprived of liberty if con-
victed, was based largely on the recognition of imprisonment as a severe sanc-
tion. 232 The Scott Court maintained that a fine is not a serious enough infringe-
ment on constitutionally protected interests to demand the same degree of pro-
cedural protection. 233
 Moreover, the Court determined that requiring counsel
for all indigent defendants in misdemeanor prosecutions would impose
substantial costs on the states. 234
 The Court declined to hold that the sixth and
fourteenth amendments require the states to incur these costs. 235
As a result of the series of decisions from Powell to Scott, the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel has been made obligatory on the states through the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment only in felony cases and in misde-
meanor cases where imprisonment is actually imposed on conviction. The
Court has held, however, that the fourteenth amendment due process require-
ment, operating of its own force, necessitates the appointment of counsel in
some state non-criminal proceedings.
Thus, in In re Gault, 236
 the Court held that juveniles in delinquency pro-
ceedings must be afforded the assistance of counsel notwithstanding the state's
characterization of the proceedings as non-criminal. 237
 The Court emphasized
the similarities between the delinquency proceeding and a criminal trial, 238
 and
observed that the ultimate result of a delinquency proceeding could be the
lengthy confinement of the juvenile. 238
 Noting that the juvenile's interests
could not adequately be protected in the absence of counse1, 24° the Colirt stated
that the juvenile needs such assistance to ensure that the facts bearing on his
sentenced to prison if convicted. Id. at 38 & n.10. The "run of misdemeanor cases," according to
the Court, would thus not be affected by the extension of the constitutional requirement of ap-
pointed counsel beyond felony cases. Id. at 40. In those cases where incarceration is imposed,
however, the Court determined that the states must bear the cost of appointing counsel. Id.
230 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
24'
	 at 373-74.
232 Id. at 372-73.
233
	 at 373. The Court also found that the mere threat of imprisonment, as opposed to
actual imprisonment, was not a sufficiently serious imposition on individual interests to require
the appointment of counsel. Id. The Court interpreted Argersinger to require that counsel be pro-
vided only in cases where the defendant is actually sentenced to prison. Id. at 372-73. As a result
of the decisions in Argersinger and Scott, trial judges must appoint counsel or lose the option of
sentencing the defendant to prison if he is convicted. See id. at 369 (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S.
at 37, 40).
234 Id.
"' Id. at 373-74.
234 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
"1 Id. at 36-37.
233 Id.
2" Id.
240 id
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case are adequately developed, that issues of law are properly resolved, and
that any available defense is adequately presented. 24 ' The Court acknowledged
that juvenile proceedings are generally conducted in a more informal manner
than criminal trials, 242 and recognized that the purpose behind such informal
procedures is to promote an atmosphere of concern for rehabilitation rather
than punishment.'" The Court concluded that counsel was nevertheless
necessary to prevent unfair and arbitrary decisions in juvenile cases. 244
Apart from its application to juvenile delinquency proceedings, the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment also has been recognized as the
source of a right to appointed counsel in state proceedings in which a prisoner
challenges an attempt to transfer him to a mental institution. The Supreme
Court, in Vitek v. Jones, 245 employed a balancing analysis and concluded that
due process requires such prisoners to be afforded the assistance of counsel. 246
The factors which the Court weighed were the prisoner's interest in avoiding
an unwarranted transfer, the risk of erroneous decisions if counsel is not pro-
vided to the prisoner, and the state's interest in segregating and treating men-
tally ill prisoners. 247 The Court recognized the strength of the prisoner's in-
terest in avoiding the stigma of being labelled mentally ill and the changes in
the conditions of his confinement which a transfer would entail. 248 The Court
deemed the risk of error when the prisoner is unrepresented to be substantial,
noting that it was likely that a prisoner thought to be mentally ill would be
unable to understand and exercise his rights. 249 Thus, the Court concluded,
such prisoners have a strong need for the assistance of counsel to protect those
rights. 250 The Court conceded that the state has an important interest in
segregating and treating mentally ill prisoners. 2" Nonetheless, the combina-
tion of the strong interest of the prisoner and the risk that this interest will not
be adequately protected if counsel is not provided led four justices to conclude
that the state must make counsel available to indigent prisoners in transfer pro-
ceedings. 252 Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, agreed that a prisoner in
this situation was entitled to independent assistance. 253 He noted, however,
that since the inquiry as to the need for transfer is essentially medical in nature,
this assistance might be provided as effectively by a psychiatrist or other mental
health professional as by an attorney. 254
241 Id.
242 Id. at 14-17.
245
	 at 15-16.
244 Id. at 18-19, 36-37.
245
	 U.S. 480 (1980).
244 Id. at 495-97.
24 ' Id. at 495.
248 Id. at 493-95.
245 Id. at 496-97.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 495.
252 Id. at 496-97.
255 Id. at 497.
254 Id. at 500. Since Justice Powell's vote was required to achieve a majority, the Vitek
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The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment also has been held to
require a right to counsel for some probationers involved in hearings in which
their right to continued enjoyment of probationary status is challenged by the
state. 255 In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 256
 the Court found that the probationer's interest
in remaining free from confinement, although weighty, was weaker than that
of a criminal defendant because the probationer's right to physical liberty has
been made conditional as a result of his prior conviction. 257 The Court also
noted the important state interest in being able to act quickly, and at minimal
cost, to reincarcerate a probationer who poses a danger to the community. 258
The Court further found that the risk of an erroneous decision was not great
because of the informal nature of the revocation proceeding. 259
 The Court
therefore concluded that, in general, counsel would not be required to ensure
fairness in probation revocation proceedings. 26°
In two types of probation cases, however, the Court found a higher risk of
error. 26 ' The Court indicated that this higher risk exists, first, in cases in which
the probationer contests the allegation that he violated the conditions of his
parole. 262
 The risk also is present, according to the Court, in cases where the
probationer makes a "timely and colorable claim" that there are mitigating
circumstances too complex or difficult for the probationer to explain adequate-
ly without the aid of counse1. 262
 The Court concluded that in these types of
cases, due process requires that the probationer be afforded the assistance of
counse1. 264
 The Court left to the officials in charge of the probation hearing the
responsibility of determining whether counsel is required in a particular
case. 265
decision can be seen as establishing a right to an appointed mental health professional rather than
a right to counsel. In either case, the principle is the same — the state must provide an indigent
with assistance in defending against potential deprivations of important liberty interests where
there is a substantial risk of erroneous deprivations in the absence of such assistance. The Lassiter
Court implicitly recognized this similarity by including Vitek in its discussion of prior decisions
establishing a right to counsel. See 452 U.S. at 25-26.
255
 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973). In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471 (1972), the Court held that parolees faced with state attempts to terminate their parole had a
due process right to certain procedural safeguards. Id. at 482. The Court determined that due
process requires that two hearings be conducted before parole is revoked. Id. at 484. The first
hearing would establish whether there was probable cause to believe that a parole violation had
been committed. Id. at 485. The second hearing would consist of an evaluation of any contested
facts and determination of whether the facts justified revocation. Id. at 488. The Morrissey Court
expressly reserved the issue of the right to counsel in parole revocation hearings. Id. at 489. The
Gagnon Court's analysis of the issue of the right to counsel in probation and parole revocation
hearings relied heavily on the reasoning of the Morrissey Court. 411 U.S. at 783.
256 411 U.S. at 778.
277 Id. at 781. See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. at 480.
256
 411 U.S. at 785, 788. See also 408 U.S. at 483.
25s
	 U.S. at 789.
260
 Id. at 790.
261 Id.
262 Id.
269 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 790-91.
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As the cases outlined above demonstrate, the Supreme Court has
recognized a right to appointed counsel in state criminal proceedings by selec-
tively incorporating the sixth amendment guarantee into the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 266 The Court also has found that the due process
clause, operating of its own force, may be the source of a right to counsel in cer-
tain state non-criminal proceedings. 267 In the next two sections, the Lassiter
Court's analysis will be examined against the background of these prior right to
counsel cases. First, it will be shown that the Court's creation of a presumption
against appointed counsel in cases where physical liberty is not at stake is not
supported by precedent and is inconsistent with the balancing approach which
the Court has traditionally employed to determine what process is due under
the fourteenth amendment. Second, the Court's adoption of a case-by-case ap-
proach to the right to counsel in parental rights termination proceedings will be
demonstrated to be at variance with the Court's traditional approach to issues
of both the right to counsel and of procedural due process generally. It will be
submitted that the Lassiter Court's departures from traditional due process
methodology will result in inadequate protection of the fundamental liberty in-
terest in matters relating to the family.
B. The Lassiter Court's Presumption
From its review of prior cases the Lassiter Court- derived the "pre-eminent
generalization "268 that the right to counsel has been recognized only in cases
where the individual's physical liberty is at stake. 269 The Court then inferred
from this generalization a presumption that there is no right to counsel where
the interest at stake is other than physical liberty. 27° Using the cases in which
the Court has considered whether due process requires appointed counsel for
indigent litigants, this section will analyze the Lassiter Court's creation of this
presumption. First, it will be shown that, contrary to the Lassiter Court's con-
clusion, the presence or absence of an interest in physical liberty has not always
been the determinative factor in decisions concerning the right to counsel. Sec-
ond, it will be demonstrated that the Lassiter Court's presumption against a
right to counsel in cases where physical liberty is not at stake is inconsistent
with the balancing approach which the Court has traditionally used to resolve
due process issues. Finally, it will be submitted that this deviation from tradi-
tional due process analysis can be explained only by an unwarranted judgment
by the Court that the interest in physical liberty is entitled to a greater degree of
constitutional protection than any other liberty interest.
The generalization that the right. to counsel has been recognized only
where the defendant faces a loss of physical liberty appears to be valid in the
266 See supra text and notes at notes 213-35.
267 See supra text and notes at notes 236-65.
268 452 U.S. at 25.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 26-27.
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criminal area. The Court in Gideon v. Wainright established the right to ap-
pointed counsel for all defendants in state felony prosecutions. 27 ' Clearly, the
defendant's interest in maintaining his physical liberty is threatened by such a
prosecution. Similarly, in Argersinger v. Hamlin, the right to counsel was extend-
ed to defendants who face the loss of physical liberty in state misdemeanor
prosecutions. 272 In contrast, in Scott v. Illinois, defendants in state misdemeanor
prosecutions who faced only a fine or the threat of imprisonment and were not
actually sentenced to incarceration were held not to have a right to appointed
counse1. 2 " The right to counsel cases in the criminal context thus support the
generalization that the right exists only where physical liberty is threatened.
In contrast, however, the cases in which the Court has considered the
right to counsel in non-criminal proceedings do not uniformly support the
Lassiter Court's generalization. The Court has established a right to counsel in
one case where physical liberty was not the interest which the individual sought
to protect. Specifically, in Vitek v. Jones, the Court held that counsel should be
provided to prisoners faced with state attempts to transfer them to mental in-
stitutions. 274 The individual interest in physical liberty is not implicated in such
a proceeding since the prisoner remains incarcerated regardless of whether the
transfer occurs. The Vitek Court explicitly recognized that the prisoner's in-
terest in freedom from confinement was extinguished by his criminal convic-
tion."' The Court found, however, that the transfer to a mental institution in-
volved adverse consequences for other liberty interests of the prisoner. 276 The
Court noted that the prisoner may be subject to involuntary psychiatric treat-
ment."' The Court also recognized that the prisoner, if transferred, is exposed
to the stigma of being labelled mentally i11. 278 The Vitek Court concluded that
the prisoner's interest in avoiding these consequences of the transfer was suffi-
ciently important to require the state to incur the cost of providing the prisoner
with counsel in order to ensure against unjustified transfer decisions. 279
The Lassiter Court cited Vitek as support for the generalization that the
right to counsel has been extended only to cases where physical liberty is the in-
dividual interest at stake. 28° Significantly, in Lassiter the Court used the term
"personal freedom" rather than "physical liberty" to describe the interest im-
plicated in Vitek. 2" The term "personal freedom" could comprehend the in-
terests which the Vitek Court found warranted the protection of appointed
counsel. The generalization which the Lassiter Court derived from prior cases
2" 372 U.S. at 344. See supra text and notes at notes 213-21.
"2 407 U.S. at 37. See supra text and notes at notes 222-29.
2" 440 U.S. at 373-74. See supra text and notes at notes 230-35.
226 445 U.S. at 496-97. See supra text and notes at notes 245-54.
27!
	at 491-93.
226 Id. at 493.
277 Id. at 492.
2" Id.
279 Id. at 495-97. See supra text and notes at notes 245-54.
2" 452 U.S. at 25-26.
2" Id. at 25.
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was expressed, however, only in terms of physical liberty. 282 The Lassiter ma-
jority, citing Vitek to support its generalization, refused to recognize the
Court's determination in Vitek that interests other than physical liberty could
be deemed sufficiently important to require the protection of counsel.
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, the Lassiter Court's generalization
that the right to counsel has been recognized only in cases involving a depriva-
tion of physical liberty is not uniformly supported by prior cases. Of greater
concern, however, is the Lassiter Court's transformation of this generalization
into a presumption that due process does not require that the right to counsel
extend beyond this class of cases. In cases involving the right to counsel in state
criminal proceedings, the Court has indeed drawn a line between those cases
that involve a deprivation of physical liberty and those that do not. In Gideon
and Argersinger, the Court concluded that counsel is a fundamental right in
felony cases and in misdemeanor cases where imprisonment is imposed on con-
viction."' The Court in those cases determined that counsel is necessary to en-
sure a fundamentally fair trial and that a defendant cannot be deprived of his
liberty unless counsel is provided for him.'" By contrast, in Scott v. Illinois, the
Court held that the sixth and fourteenth amendments do not require that
counsel be provided to criminal defendants in misdemeanor cases where the
penalty is merely a fine. 285 In Scott, the Court stressed that the Argersinger deci-
sion marked the outer limit of the state's obligation to provide counsel for in-
digent criminal defendants. 286
The Court's distinction, for purposes of the right to counsel in state
criminal proceedings, between cases which involve a deprivation of physical
liberty and those where only a fine is imposed, recognizes the difference in
severity between these sanctions. The Court pointed out that imprisonment is
a penalty "different in kind" from a fine."' A person who is imprisoned is
deprived of his freedom of movement and his freedom to associate with family
and friends. A person who is subject only to a fine escapes these consequences
of imprisonment. Moreover, as the Court in Argersinger recognized, imprison-
ment, even for a short time, may have serious adverse consequences for a de-
fendant's career and reputation. 288 The Court's conclusion that it was
necessary to distinguish between the two very different sanctions which may be
imposed in criminal cases in order to determine when counsel must be provid-
ed, however, does not justify the Lassiter Court's extension of this distinction to
termination cases and a fortiori, does not warrant a presumption against a
right to counsel in all cases where physical liberty is not involved.
1" Id. The Lassiter Court stated that "such a right has been recognized to exist only
where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses'the litigation." Id.
283 372 U.S. at 344; 407 U.S. at 37.
234 372 U.S. at 344; 407 U.S. at 37.
'a' 440 U.S. at 373-74.
286 Id. at 373.
237 407 U.S. at 37.
268 Id. at 37 & n.6 (quoting Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) and Marston
v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691, 696 (E.D. Va. 1971)).
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very existence and survival of the race. " 299 The Court also has recognized that
parents have a basic right to make certain important decisions regarding the
upbringing of their children. 306
 The Court has often held that only an impor-
tant state interest will justify intrusion in the family relationship.' 01 The in-
terest in family integrity has thus been recognized as a vital component of the
liberty protected by the due process clause, 302 yet the Lassiter Court failed to ac-
cord that interest sufficient procedural protection.
Despite its recognition of the fundamental nature of a parent's right to
maintain the relationship with his or her child and the commanding nature of
the parent's interest in avoiding an unjustified termination of parental
rights, 3 ° 3 the Lassiter Court held that there is no absolute right to counsel in
parental rights termination proceedings. 304 Yet the Court identified no state in-
terest which outweighed the interest of the parent. Although the Court
recognized that the state has an important interest in protecting the welfare of
the child,'" the Court did not find that this factor weighed against the parent's
interest in securing appointed counsel. In fact, the Court noted that the state's
interest in protecting the welfare of the child may be promoted by providing
counsel to the parent because accurate decisions are more likely if both parties
are represented.'" The Court also recognized that the state's interest in
minimizing the cost of termination proceedings was not significant when com-
pared to the interests of the parent.'" Finally, the Court concluded that there is
299 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
3°° Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 401-03 (invalidating a state statute which made
teaching German to public school children a crime on the ground that such an interference with
the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children could be justified only by an
emergency which made the need to prohibit such instruction compelling); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating state statute which required compulsory public
school education on the ground that it unreasonably interfered with the right of parents to control
the upbringing and education of their children). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
232-33 (1972) (finding parents' interest in directing the upbringing of their children, in combina-
tion with first amendment right to freedom of religion, sufficient to overcome state's interest in
compulsory education).
30 ' See supra cases cited at note 300.
392 For further instances where the Court recognized the importance of family life, see
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("[F]reedom of personal choice
in matters of . . . family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. "); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972) ("It is plain that the
interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children
comes to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which
derive merely from shifting economic arrangements." (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77,
95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It
is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents.").
3 " 452 U.S. at 27. The Court recognized that prior decisions have established that the
parent's right to the companionship, care, custody and management of their children merits a
high degree of constitutional protection. Id. Noting that termination is "a unique kind of
deprivation," the Court deemed commanding the parent's interest in ensuring that any decision
to terminate his or her parental rights is made in a fair and accurate manner. Id.
904 Id. at 31.
305 Id. at 27.
3°6 Id. at 27-28.
30' Id. at 28.
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a potentially substantial risk of error in termination proceedings when the
parent is unrepresented.'"
Under the traditional due process balancing test, the combination of the
commanding interest of the parent in avoiding an unjustified termination of
parental rights and the potentially substantial risk of error in the absence of
counsel for the parent would certainly have been found to outweigh the state's
concededly less substantial interest in avoiding an obligation to appoint
counsel. If the Lassiter Court had followed the method of analysis of prior four-
teenth amendment due process cases, it would have concluded that indigent
parents have an absolute right to counsel in termination proceedings. Instead,
the Lassiter Court weighed the result of the balancing test against the presump-
tion of no right to counsel where physical liberty is not involved and found that
the presumption would not be overcome in all cases.'" The Court therefore
adopted a case-by-case approach to the right to counsel in termination pro-
ceedings, which requires that the result of the balancing test, as applied to the
facts of each case, be weighed against the presumption against a right to
counsel in parental rights termination proceedings.'"
As the preceding analysis indicates, the Lassiter Court's injection of a
presumption against a right to counsel into the analysis of the due process re-
quirements for termination proceedings constitutes a departure from the
Court's usual method of resolving due process issues. The balancing approach
of prior cases is no longer determinative. Instead, indigent parents in termina-
tion proceedings who claim a right to appointed counsel must demonstrate not
only that they are entitled to counsel on the basis of the balancing test, but
must also overcome the presumption against a right to counsel in any case
where physical liberty is not at stake. This additional hurdle is unjustifiable in
cases where the right which the litigant seeks to protect by securing the aid of
counsel has been recognized as fundamental, such as parental rights in ter-
mination proceedings. If the recognition of parental rights as fundamental is to
have meaning, the protection accorded against unwarranted state interference
with those rights must be commensurate with that accorded to litigants facing
the deprivation of their fundamental right to physical liberty.
The Lassiter Court, having recognized the importance of the individual in-
terest at stake in a parental rights termination proceeding, the potentially high
risk of error in the absence of counsel for the parent, and the less significant
state interest in avoiding the obligation to appoint counsel, should have held
that due process requires the appointment of counsel for all indigent parents
faced with state attempts to terminate their rights with respect to their children.
Instead, the Court found that counsel was not required in all cases because the
presumption against the right to counsel would not always be overcome.'" The
Court therefore held that the right to counsel in termination proceedings is to
3" Id. at 30.
"9 Id. at 31.
3" Id. at 31-32.
"' Id. at 31.
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The Court's decisions in the criminal cases demonstrate that the interest
in physical liberty is fundamental, and, therefore, entitled to the highest degree
of constitutional protection. In non-criminal cases as well, the Court has con-
cluded that counsel must be provided if the individual faces a possible depriva-
tion of physical liberty."9
 The Lassiter Court's analysis is deficient in that it
transforms the premise that freedom from confinement is a fundamental liberty
interest that merits the protection of counsel into a presumption that it is the
only interest which requires this degree of procedural protection. The creation
of this presumption is inconsistent with the flexible, balancing approach which
the Court has traditionally employed in fourteenth amendment due process
cases.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that due process is a flexible con-
cept. 29° Giving content to the due process clause involves, as the Lassiter Court
recognized, a determination of what procedures are required to ensure that
state action which impinges on constitutionally protected interests is conducted
in a fundamentally fair manner."' The method which the Court has devised
for the determination of the requisites of due process in state civil and ad-
ministrative proceedings involves a balancing of three elements. 292 These
elements are: the individual interest threatened by the state's action; the state's
interests implicated in the proceeding, including the interest in minimizing
costs; and the risk of error in the proceeding in the absence of the requested
procedural protection. 293
 The Court has applied this three-part balancing test
to determine the content of due process in a wide variety of contexts.'" For ex-
ample, in the case of proceedings where the state attempts to transfer prisoners
to mental institutions, the Court's application of the three-part balancing test
"° See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36-37 (establishing a right to counsel in juvenile proceed-
ings); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 790 (establishing a right to counsel in probation revoca-
tion proceedings where the probationer cannot effectively present his case without assistance).
29°
 See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961) (" [E]ite process', unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed con-
tent unrelated to time, place, and circumstances."); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972) ("[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situa-
tion demands.").
29 ' 452 U.S. at 24-25.
292 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35.
293 Id. The Court stated that prior decisions established that the due process determina-
tion requires consideration of the following elements:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and final-
ly, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.
Id.
294
 See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal and Correctional Complex, 442
U.S. 1, 14 (1979) (release on parole); Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435
U.S. 78, 86 & n.3 (1978) (dismissal from medical school); Smith v. Organization of Foster
Families, 431 U.S. 816, 848-49 (1977) (removal of children from foster homes); and cases cited
infra at notes 346-66.
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led to the conclusion that the prisoner was entitled to a number of procedural
safeguards, including the right to counsel. 295 The Court, in Vitek v. Jones, deter-
mined that the prisoner's interest in avoiding mandatory psychiatric treatment
and the stigma of being diagnosed as mentally ill, combined with a potentially
high risk that the prisoner would be unable adequately to protect his interests
on his own, outweighed the state's interest in summary proceedings. 296
In effect, the Lassiter Court's creation of a presumption against a right to
counsel in any case where physical liberty is not at stake adds an additional step
to the Supreme Court's due process analysis. It appears that the balancing ap-
proach of prior cases will no longer be determinative. Under Lassiter, in any
case where the interest at stake is other than physical liberty, it will be
necessary to overcome the presumption against the right to counsel, even
though the individual interest at stake in the proceeding outweighs the state's
interest in not appointing counsel and the risk of an erroneous decision in the
absence of counsel is high. This result can logically rest only on a determina-
tion that the interest in physical liberty is somehow more fundamental than any
other liberty interest. The Lassiter majority made no attempt to justify such a
premise. The proposition that the individual interest in avoiding deprivation of
physical liberty, for however short a time, merits greater protection than does
the interest in avoiding a permanent separation of parent and child is difficult
to rationalize. Further, there is no compelling legal justification for the conclu-
sion that physical liberty merits a higher degree of protection than any other in-
dividual interest. The Court has stated explicitly that the "liberty" encom-
passed by the due process clause includes far more than the interest in physical
liberty:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common oc-
cupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at com-
mon law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by men."'
The importance of non-physical aspects of liberty, including family association
has thus long been recognized by the Court.
The Lassiter Court's presumption against the right to counsel in termina-
tion cases also ignores the fundamental nature of rights relating to the family.
The Court, in numerous decisions, has recognized the fundamental nature of
these rights. For example, the Court has stated that "the right to marry is of
fundamental importance. " 298 Similarly, the right to bear children has been
characterized as "one of the basic civil rights of man ... fundamental to the
295 445 U.S. at 495-97. See supra text and notes at notes 245-54.
29.6 Id.
292 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
29d
	
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978). See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 399.
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be determined on a case-by-case basis." 2
 The problems raised by the Court's
decision to adopt a case-by-case approach to the right to counsel in parental
rights termination proceedings will be examined in the following section.
C. The Case-by-Case Approach
As indicated by the preceding section, the Lassiter Court's acceptance of a
presumption against a right to counsel in cases where physical liberty is not at
stake led the majority to conclude that due process does not require an absolute
right to appointed counsel for indigent parents involved in proceedings aimed
at the termination of their parental rights. The Court instead held that the
determination of whether counsel must be provided to satisfy the due process
requirement of fundamental fairness is to be made on a case-by-case basis.
This section will begin with an examination of the Court's previous experience
with a case-by-case approach to the right to counsel in criminal cases. The
Court's response to the lessons learned regarding the disadvantages of such an
approach will then be considered. It will be shown that the problems inherent
in such an approach to the right to counsel in criminal cases are equally present
in the context of parental rights termination proceedings. In addition, the
Court's general approach to due process issues will be examined. It will be
demonstrated that the Lassiter Court's adoption of a case-by-case approach to
the right to counsel is incompatible with the Court's traditional due process
methodology, and ignores the Court's longstanding respect for familial rights.
A case-by-case approach to the right to counsel in criminal cases was
established in Betts v. Brady, where the Court held that the right to counsel is
not required in all state felony proceedings."' For twenty years after the Betts
decision, when a defendant claimed that the failure to provide him with counsel
denied him due process, the Court examined the trial record to determine if it
had been conducted fairly.'" An examination of the cases decided using this
approach reveals that the Court became less willing over time to assume that
the presence of counsel would not have had a signficant effect on the fairness
and accuracy of the trial."' At the beginning of the period in which the Court
applied the case-by-case approach, a defendant was required to demonstrate
that he was actually prejudiced by the state's refusal to furnish him with
counsel. 316 In later cases, the defendant was required to demonstrate only that
his defense was potentially prejudiced by the absence of counsel, a far less ex-
3'2 Id. at 31-32.
"5 316 U.S. at 473.
514 See, e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 443-47 (1962); Uveges v. Penn-
sylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 440-42 (1948); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 682-84 (1948); Bute v. Il-
linois, 333 U.S. 640, 644, 670-77 (1948).
"5 Commentators have described this development. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright:
The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 211, 251-64; Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twenty Years
Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REV. 219, 278-81 (1962).
"6 See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 739 (1948); Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S.
134, 137 (1947).
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acting standard."' Ultimately, the Court repudiated the case-by-case ap-
proach entirely. In Gideon v. Wainright, the Court established an absolute right
to appointed counsel in state felony proceedings. 3 t 8 The progressive liberaliza-
tion of the Court's application of the case-by-case approach suggests that the
Court became less confident over time that appellate review could yield reliable
estimates of the prejudicial effect the lack of counsel might have had on the
fairness of the trial. The case-by-case approach thus created the risk that de-
fendants would be tried and convicted unfairly and that the unfairness would
not be detected by appellate review. The Court's decision to replace the case-
by-case approach with an absolute rule that counsel must be provided to all in-
digent defendants in state felony proceedings indicates that the Court deemed
this risk unacceptable.
Since Gideon, the Court has rejected the use of a case-by-case approach in
state misdemeanor prosecutions where the defendant faces imprisonment if
convicted. 319 The Court has also adhered to a general approach to the right to
counsel in certain non-criminal state proceedings, such as juvenile delinquency
proceedings32° and hearings on prisoner transfers to mental institutions. 3" In
Argersinger v. Hamlin, Chief Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion, explicitly
recognized the inherent risk that unfair convictions will not be detected
through a case-by-case approach to the issue of the right to counsel in misde-
meanor prosecutions. 322 The Chief Justice noted that an appeal from an un-
counselled trial is likely to be of little value since "the die is usually cast when
judgment is entered on an uncounselled trial record. " 323 The risks involved in
a case-by-case approach have thus caused the Court to adopt a general rule
providing a right to counsel where certain important individual interests are at
stake.
The only exception to the Court's practice of deciding right to counsel
cases on a general basis is the Court's decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli that the
right to counsel for indigent probationers at revocation proceedings is to be
determined on a case-by-case basis. 3 " The adoption of a case-by-case approach
in Gagnon was a clear departure from the general approach which the Court has
favored in right to counsel cases since the repudiation of the Betts rule. The
3" See, e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443, 447 (1962); Hudson v. North
Carolina, 363 U.S. 697, 702-04 (1960).
918 372 U.S. at 344-45. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, explicitly recognized
the extent to which the Betts approach had been eroded over time. Id. at 350-51 (Harlan, J., con-
curring). He noted that, in effect, the mere fact that the defendant was the subject of a felony
prosecution had become a sufficient condition, under the case-by-case approach, for the appoint-
ment of counsel. Id. at 351.
319 407 U.S. at 37. The suggestion that the Court adopt a case-by-case approach to the
right to appointed counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions was made in a concurring opinion by
Justice Powell, Id. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring in the result).
320 387 U.S. at 36-37. See supra text and notes at notes 236-44.
32 ' 445 U.S. at 496-97. See supra text and notes at notes 245-54.
322 407 U.S. at 41 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the result).
323 Id.
324 411 U.S. at 790.
1210	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:1177
presence of an important, but less than complete, liberty interest in the proba-
tioner and the ability to specify a discrete sub-set of cases where the assistance
of counsel could make a significant contribution to the fairness and accuracy of
the proceeding appear to be crucial factors to the decision. The conditional
nature of the probationer's interest in Gagnon led the Court to conclude that
while an absolute right to counsel was not warranted, a flat rule that counsel
need not be appointed in any case was also not appropriate. 325 The acceptable
risk of error in a probation revocation proceeding thus fell somewhere between
the minimal risk permissible in state prosecutions where incarceration is the
consequence of conviction and the far greater risk permitted in misdemeanor
prosecutions that result only in the imposition of a fine.
In most revocation proceedings, according to the Gagnon Court, the risk of
an erroneous decision to terminate probation is sufficiently low that counsel
need not be provided. 32° The Court was able to identify, however, a class of
cases in which the risk of error would be significantly higher."' This class of
cases included those where the probationer either disputed the allegation that
he had violated the conditions of his probation or alleged that there were
significant mitigating circumstances which made revocation inappropriate. 328
In order to ensure that the probationer's conditional liberty interest was given
protection commensurate with its semi-fundamental nature, the Court held
that counsel must be provided in this set of cases. 329
The Court's ability to identify, with some degree of specificity, that sub-
set of cases where the risk of error is higher than that generally existing in pro-
bation revocation proceedings reduces the uncertainty inherent in a case-by-
case approach to right to counsel issues. As the Court conceded, however,
there is still a risk that counsel will not be provided in some cases where fairness
would require that the probationer have such assistance. 33° This risk exists
because an arguable defense might not be uncovered except by an attorney and
thus the probationer would be unable to make the preliminary showing of
disputed issues or mitigating circumstances which would entitle him to ap-
pointed counsel under the standards established in Gagnon . 3" This possibility
did not render the case-by-case approach inadequate, according to the Gagnon
Court, because the acceptable risk of error in probation revocation pro-
ceedings, given the conditional nature of the probationer's liberty interest, is
higher than that which would be permitted in criminal proceedings where a de-
fendant's unconditional liberty interest in freedom from confinement is at
stake. 33 2
The reasoning which justifies the adoption of a case-by-case approach to
the right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings is not applicable to
325 Id.
326 Id.
3" Id.
328 Id.
323 Id.
$3° Id. at 789.
331 Id. at 789-90.
332 Id. at 789.
July 1982)	 CASENOTES	 1211
proceedings in which the state seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship.
The Court has indicated in numerous decisions that there is a basic liberty in-
terest in the family. 333 The Lassiter Court itself noted that prior decisions have
"made plain beyond the need for multiple citation" 334 that a parent's right to
custody and control over the upbringing of the child is entitled to a high degree
of protection."' The parents' interest in ensuring that any decision to ter-
minate their parental rights is made accurately is, as the Lassiter Court
recognized, a commanding one. 338 This interest is thus not analagous to that of
a probationer facing a revocation proceeding whose continuing freedom from
confinement is, as a result of his criminal conviction, subject to conditions im-
posed by the state.
Consequently, while the risk of error inherent in a case-by-case approach
to the right to counsel may have been acceptable in the context of probation
revocation proceedings, it should not be permitted when the consequence of an
erroneous decision is an unwarranted permanent abrogation of the parents'
fundamental rights relating to the custody and care of their child. Given the
commanding nature of the parents' interest in a correct decision, which, as the
Lassiter Court recognized, is shared by the state, the acceptable risk of er-
roneous terminations should be no higher than that deemed permissible in
other cases where fundamental rights are threatened by state action. Thus, a
case-by-case approach to the right to counsel in termination proceedings is in-
appropriate. The risk inherent in such an approach — that counsel will not be
provided in a case where the termination proceeding cannot be conducted fair-
ly in the absence of counsel — should be unacceptable where the result may be
the permanent disruption of the parent-child relationship.
The Gagnon rationale is also distinguishable because there the Court was
able to reduce the uncertainty inherent in a case-by-case approach. The Court
identified a specific sub-set of cases where, presumptively, counsel should be
provided to indigents in probation revocation proceedings."' The Lassiter
Court offered no similar guidelines for the determination of when counsel
should be provided for indigent parents facing state attempts to terminate their
parental rights. This failure to fashion such guidelines is not surprising. Before-
the-fact estimates of either the complexity of the issues likely to arise or the
parents' ability to deal with them effectively are unreliable predictors of the
need for counsel.
The Court's general rejection of the Belts rule338 suggests that determina-
tions as to the need for counsel could not be made in advance with any certain-
ty in criminal cases. The Lassiter Court offered no reason to believe that judges
presiding over termination proceedings will have any greater success in pre-
dicting accurately whether a particular parent requires the assistance of
533 See supra text and notes at notes 297-303.
334 452 U.S. at 27.
335 Id.
335 Id.
337 See supra text and notes at notes 261-64.
"a See supra text and notes at notes 313-18.
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counsel. While the specific statutory standards for termination vary from state
to state, common bases for termination are that the parent has abused, ne-
glected or abandoned the child and that this conduct is unlikely to be altered in
the future. 339 These standards are broad and imprecise. 34° In a number of
states, after one or more of the statutory grounds for termination have been
established, the judge must make the further determination that termination is
in the best interests of the child. 54 ' Such a determination requires consideration
of all facets of the parent-child relationship. The range of possible parental
responses to the claim that termination is warranted is thus very broad. It is,
therefore, not realistic to expect a judge to determine before the proceeding has
begun what kinds of arguments the parent may have as to why termination is
not appropriate or to estimate with any degree of certainty the parent's ability
to recognize and communicate those arguments in the context of a judicial pro-
ceeding. Inevitably, mistaken decisions as to the need for counsel will be made.
As a result of such decisions, some parents will be permanently deprived of
their children after proceedings which do not meet the standards of fairness re-
quired by the due process clause.
Further, it is unlikely that appellate review of termination proceedings will
significantly reduce the risk that termination decisions will be made unfairly.
The Court has recognized the impossibility of making an adequate post-
conviction determination as to the effect of the absence of counsel on the fair-
"g See supra statutes cited at note 4.
"0 The statutes have been criticized frequently for their failure to define with greater
precision the standards for termination. See Wald, supra note 4, at 633-34, 639-41; Note, The
Right:to Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to Stale Removal and Termination Proceedings,
68 GEO. L.J. 213, 230-40 (1979).
Several courts have also been critical of the vagueness of the statutory standards. See,
e.g., Davis v. Smith, 266 Ark. 112, 124, 583 S.W,2d 37, 44 (1979) (Court held that ARK. STAT.
ANN. 5 56-128(2)(h), which provided for termination on a finding that parents are "not fit and
competent to have custody and control of said children and are unable to provide a proper home
for the children," was unconstitutionally vague. After this decision, the provision in question was
repealed. 1980 Ark. Acts (1st Ex. Sess.) No. 66, 55 2, 3). See also Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769,
777, 779 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (Court held ALA. CODE, Title 13, S 352(4), which authorized sum-
mary removal of a child from his home if "it appears that the child is in such condition that its
welfare requires" and ALA. CODE, Title 13, 5 350, which defined "neglected" child as one who
has "no proper parental care" or whose home, "by reason of neglect, cruelty, or depravity . . .
is an unfit or improper place for such child," unconstitutionally vague. The statutory provisions
challenged in Roe were later repealed by 1975 Acts of Alabama No. 1205, S 5, which made major
changes in the structure of the Alabama judicial system. The juvenile courts of Alabama are now
governed by ALA. CODE 55 12-15 (1975).). See also Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10,
17-20 (S.D. Iowa 1975), aff'd in part, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976). In Alsager, the federal district
court held that a portion of Iowa's termination statute was unconstitutionally vague. 406 F.
Sum), at 21. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, although finding that resolution of the con-
stitutional issue was unnecessary to decide the case, stated that the vagueness and overbreadth at-
tacks on the statutory provisions were serious ones. 545 F.2d at 1138. The statute at issue, IOWA
CODE ANN. S 232.41 (West 1949), provided for termination on a finding that the "parents have
continuously or repeatedly refused to give the child necessary parental care and protection" or on
a finding that the parents are unfit by reason of "conduct found by the court likely to be
detrimental to the physical or mental health or morals of the child."
"' See, e.g. , supra statutes cited at note 4. The Supreme Court has recognized that the
"best interests" standard is very broad. See Smith v, Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S.
816, 835 n.6, 862-63 (1977).
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ness of state criminal trials.'" There is no reason to believe that an appeal
based on the record of a termination proceeding will be any more likely to be an
adequate safeguard against unfair and arbitrary decisions. In both cases, the
inquiry attempts to predict what might have occurred had counsel been pres-
ent. In neither case can such post hoc predictions be made with any certainty.
There may be facts relating to the parent-child relationship that are highly rele-
vant to the decision which, as a result of the parent's failure to appreciate their
importance, would be totally absent from the trial court record. Appellate
review can be of little value in the absence of the very information which would
indicate that counsel might have had a significant impact on the fairness and
accuracy of the decision.
Moreover, even where all of the pertinent facts appear in the record, ap-
pellate review cannot ensure that an uncounselled parent in a termination pro-
ceeding has been given a fair hearing because those facts which do appear in
the record are subject to varying interpretations by the reviewing court. In the
Lassiter case itself, for example, five Justices found that the failure to appoint
counsel for Ms. Lassiter did not render the proceeding in which her parental
rights were terminated unfair. 943 The dissenting Justices, in contrast, found
that the facts of the Lassiter case clearly demonstrated the need for counsel in
termination proceedings.'" This disagreement is evidence of the uncertainty
which inheres in a case-by-case approach to the right to appointed counsel. In
cases where the individual interest is less than fundamental, as in the case of
probation revocation proceedings, this uncertainty may be tolerable. It should
not be acceptable in the context of parental rights termination proceedings.
Where the consequence of an erroneous decision is the permanent severance of
the parent-child relationship, a much higher degree of certainty as to the
fairness of the proceeding in which the decision is made should be required. In
order to ensure that the parents' commanding interest in a correct decision is
given adequate protection, a general rule that counsel must be provided in all
parental rights termination proceedings should have been established.
A general rule that counsel must be provided would also be more consis-
tent with the Court's traditional approach to due process issues other than the
right to counsel. The method of analysis which the Court has traditionally
employed in dealing with procedural due process issues consists of an examina-
tion of the competing interests of the individual and the state and of the risk of
error in the absence of further procedural safeguards as general characteristics
of the context under consideration."' The Court then balances these factors
and develops procedural rules to govern the entire class of cases within that
context.
Thus, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court held that a hearing is required before
termination of welfare benefits.'" This holding was based, first, on the Court's
342 See supra text and notes at notes 313-23.
' 4 ' See supra text and notes at notes 115-27.
344 See supra text and notes at notes 174-89.
93 See infra cases cited at notes 346-66.
346 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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recognition that the individual interest in the continued receipt of such
payments was strong since in many cases welfare payments are the recipient's
sole source of income.'" Second, the Court recognized that while the state has
an interest in minimizing costs, this interest does not outweigh the recipient's
interest in avoiding erroneous terminations. 345
 Third, the Court considered the
risk of error in the absence of a pretermination hearing. 349 The Court noted
that credibility and veracity are often at issue in termination actions."° Written
submissions would not, therefore, provide an adequate basis for decision."'
Thus, a hearing was deemed necessary. 352
 The risk of error in a decision based
on written submissions was further heightened, according to the Court,
because most welfare recipients do not have the necessary skills to make an ef-
fective written presentation. 353
 The Court concluded that the risk of unwar-
ranted terminations in the absence of a pretermination hearing was sufficiently
high, when considered in conjunction with the strong personal interest in
avoiding such a result, to require a pretermination hearing in all cases.'"
In Mathews v. Eldridge, by contrast, the Court held that a hearing is not re-
quired prior to the termination of social security medical disability benefits.'"
Here, the Court viewed the personal interest in uninterrupted benefits as less
compelling than that of the welfare recipient in Goldberg. 356 The Court based
this view on the notion that disability benefits are not likely to constitute the
recipient's sole source of income. 357 Since the individual interest was deemed
less compelling, the state's interest in conserving fiscal and administrative
resources was given greater weight. 358
 Thus, written submissions were deemed
sufficient to ensure accurate decisions in the majority of cases since the issues
are essentially medical. 3" The Court recognized that, in some cases, credibility
and veracity may be important issues and, thus, written submissions may not
necessarily ensure accurate decisions in all cases.'" The Court declined to for-
mulate specialized rules for this sub-set of cases, however, noting that "pro-
cedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-
finding process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare
exceptions. " 361
This general or "context" approach to procedural due process issues has
342 Id. at 261.
3" Id. at 264.
949 Id. at 265-66.
"° Id. at 268-69.
"' Id. at 269.
352 Id.
353 Id.
354 Id.
"5 Id. at 266.
356 424 U.S. at 349.
337
 Id. at 342.
33B Id.
3" Id. at 347-48.
360 Id. at 344.
361 Id.
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been applied also in cases involving summary suspensions of driver's 962 and
horse-training353 licenses, commitments of minor children to mental institu-
tions,'" and corporal punishment of school children:965 The Court in each of
these cases examined the interest of the individual, the state, and the risk of er-
ror, then formulated general rules applicable to all cases within that context
based on the balancing of these factors.
The application of this "context" approach to the issue of the right to
counsel in parental rights termination proceedings would have resulted in the
establishment of a general rule requiring the appointment of counsel for
parents in such proceedings. Having characterized the parent's interest as
commanding, the state's interest as comparatively insignificant, and the risk of
error as potentially substantial, 366 the Court could not reasonably have con-
cluded that counsel is not generally required.
The Lassiter Court's adoption of a case-by-case approach to the right to
counsel in termination proceedings thus constitutes a departure from the tradi-
tional method of resolving procedural due process issues. More importantly, as
the preceding analysis indicates, the adoption of a case-by-case approach
creates a significant risk of unfair decisions. The Court found a similar risk
unacceptable in criminal proceedings where the consequence of an unfair deci-
sion may be an unjustified deprivation of physical liberty. It should be equally
intolerable where the result may be an unwarranted termination of the rela-
tionship between parent and child.
The analysis of the Lassiter majority thus departs in two significant
respects from the Court's usual approach to procedural due process issues.
First, the Court's recognition of a presumption against a right to counsel in any
case where the individual interest in physical liberty is not at stake adds an ad-
ditional element to the balancing test which, in the past, has been the deter-
minative method of resolving due process issues. Second, the Court's adoption
of a case-by-case approach to the issue of the right to appointed counsel in
parental rights termination proceedings is a clear departure from the Court's
practice of resolving right to counsel and other procedural due process issues on
a general basis. As the analysis presented in the preceding sections
demonstrates, the effect of both departures from traditional due process
methodology is to decrease the protection afforded to parental rights in ter-
mination proceedings. This result is not consistent with a - characterization of
parental rights as fundamental. The Lassiter decision is, therefore, difficult to
reconcile with the many prior decisions in which the Court emphasized the im-
portance of individual rights with respect to the family. If, as the Lassiter
Court's analysis implies, parental rights are not among those deemed fun-
363 Id.
363 Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
364 Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979).
m' Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
366 Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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damental and thus entitled to the highest degree of constitutional protection,
the force of these prior decisions is considerably undercut.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF LASSITER FOR THE FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
The Lassiter decision has important implications for the future develop-
ment of the right to counsel. The reasoning of the Lassiter Court divides the
liberty protected by the due process clause, for right to counsel purposes, into
two distinct categories. In cases where the indigent litigant claiming a right to
appointed counsel faces a deprivation of physical liberty, he will benefit from a
presumption in favor of the right to counse1. 367
 In cases where the interest
sought to be protected is other than physical liberty, the indigent will have to
overcome a presumption against the right to counsel. Litigants who claim a
right to counsel in order to ensure against unfair deprivations of liberty in-
terests other than physical liberty will thus face an uphill battle. The Lassiter
Court found that the combination of an admittedly commanding individual
liberty interest, a far less significant state interest, and a potentially significant
risk of error did not suffice to overcome the presumption against the right to
counsel. This result indicates that the presumption against the right in cases in-
volving interests other than physical liberty will be very difficult to overcome.
Thus, it is very unlikely that parents in dependency or neglect pro-
ceedings, whose interest is in avoiding a temporary loss of custody of the child,
will be found to have an absolute right to counsel. In fact, the Court could con-
ceivably conclude that the interest of the parent in avoiding a temporary loss of
custody was so much less significant than the interest of a parent in a termina-
tion proceeding that the presumption against a right to appointed counsel is not
overcome in any case.'" It is not yet clear precisely how the Court will apply
the Lassiter analysis in this type of case. It is clear, however, that the Lassiter
reasoning will severely limit the further development of the right to appointed
counsel.
367 See supra text and notes at notes 93-107.
366 Thus, after Lassiter, a right to counsel claim by an indigent in a civil contempt pro-
ceeding, where a finding of contempt may result in incarceration, will likely be successful. For
federal court decisions which have found a right to counsel in contempt proceedings, see e.g.,
Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 960 (S.D. N.Y. 1976); In re DiBella, 518 F.2d 955, 959 (2d
Cir. 1975).
Similarly, a right to counsel claim by an indigent involved in a civil commitment pro-
ceeding, who faces confinement in an institution if found incompetent, should find a receptive at-
titude on the Court. Several courts have already found a right to counsel in civil commitment
proceedings. See, e.g., In re Hop, 171 Cal..11ptr. 721, 728, 623 P.2d 282, 289 (1981); In re
Fisher, 39 Ohio State 2d 71, 72, 313 N.E.2d 851, 858 (1974); Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F.
Supp. 926, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1971); Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393, 396 (10th Cir. 1968).
While the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of the right to counsel
in civil commitment proceedings, the Court has recognized that commitment involves a substan-
tial curtailment of liberty and thus requires extensive clue process protection. See, e.g. , Addington
v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1978); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1967).
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The implications of the Lassiter reasoning with respect to claims for pro-
cedural safeguards other than the right to counsel are less clear. As indicated in
the preceding sections,'" the reasoning of the Lassiter Court seems ultimately to
be based on a judgment that the interest in physical liberty is more fundamen-
tal, and therefore deserving of a higher degree of procedural protection, than
any other liberty interest. It has been submitted that this judgment is unwar-
ranted. In any event, the distinction made in Lassiter between physical liberty
and other liberty interests should not be extended to the analysis of the
availability of procedural safeguards other than the right to counsel. The
presumption against a right to counsel in cases where physical liberty is not at
stake is derived from the Lassiter Court's interpretation of prior right to counsel
cases. If the presumption must exist, its application should, therefore, be
limited to cases involving the right to counsel. In cases where the outcome of
the suit will not impinge on physical liberty and the issue is the availability of
other forms of procedural protection — the right to call witnesses and to pre-
sent evidence, the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, the
right to hold the state to a certain burden of proof — the traditional balancing
approach for the determination of what process is due should continue to ap-
ply. The Lassiter decision should not be interpreted to justify a general reduc-
tion in the procedural protection to which vital individual interests other than
physical liberty are entitled. 37°
CONCLUSION.
The Lassiter Court held that there is no absolute right to counsel in paren-
tal rights termination proceedings. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
employed a new method of analysis for right to counsel issues. The Lassiter
Court's acceptance of a presumption against a right to counsel in cases not in-
volving physical liberty and its willingness to accept a case-by-case approach to
the right to counsel in parental rights termination proceedings constitute clear
departures from traditional due process methodology. The application of the
Lassiter analysis will severely limit the further expansion of the right to counsel
in state court proceedings. The protection afforded individual interests other
than physical liberty will decrease. This result is not justified particularly when
the individual interest is fundamental, such as the right of a parent to maintain
369 Before Lassiter, several state and federal courts had held that there is an absolute right
to counsel in neglect and dependency proceedings. See, e.g., Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599, 604
(5th Cir. 1981); Smith v. Edminston, 431 F. Supp. 941, 945 (W.D. Tenn. 1977); Crist v. Divi-
sion of Youth and Family Services, 128 N. J. Super. 402, 416, 320 A.2d 203, 211 (1974).
"° See supra text and notes at notes 296-97; 333-36.
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his relationship with his child. In order to minimize the adverse effect of the
Lassiter Court's reasoning on the constitutional protection accorded fundamen-
tal liberty interests, it is suggested that the Lassiter analysis be limited to right to
counsel cases . 3 "
JANICE M. DUFFY
371
 In Santosky v. Kramer, 50 1..T.S.L.W. 4333 (1982), the Court employed the three-
part balancing test to evaluate a claim that New York's preponderance of the evidence standard
of proof for termination actions violated due process. Id. at 4333. The Court expressly stated that
the presumption employed in Lassiter was not applicable to the issue of the burden of proof,
limiting its relevance to right to counsel issues. Id. at 4335. Noting that the parents' interest was
fundamental, id. at 4335, the state's interest was comparably insignificant, id. at 4338-39, and
the risk of error was substantial, id. at 4337-38, the Court held that the preponderance of the
evidence standard was too low to satisfy due process in termination proceedings. Id. at 4339. The
Court declared that the states must employ the more stringent "dear and convincing evidence"
standard of proof in termination cases, and may employ the even stricter "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard. Id. at 4339.
